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Abstract
We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard
evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private
information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact-ﬁnder,
who interprets the evidence and decides a ﬁnding in the case. We identify conditions
under which hard evidence generates value that is robust to the scope of rational
reasoning and behavior. These fail if the litigant’s private information is suﬃciently
strong relative to the “face-value signal” of evidence, and then hard evidence may be
misleading. Rules that exclude some relevant hard evidence can be justiﬁed.
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1 Introduction
In common-law countries, judges have latitude to exclude relevant evidence from being pre-
sented at trial and from being considered by juries. The United States’ Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) Rule 403 describes various circumstances that warrant exclusion, and it
oﬀers a limited explanation:
The court may exclude relevant evidence if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by a danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, con-
fusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence.
The related Rule 404 provides for a particular circumstance in stating that “Evidence of a
person’s character or character trait is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character or trait.” Both of these rules have origins
in common law tradition. The existence of these rules, and the broad judicial practice
of excluding certain types of evidence, raises two questions: How can excluding relevant
evidence improve accuracy in the deliberations of a jury, as Rule 403 suggests, and what
kinds of evidence should be excluded?
We address these questions with a theoretical model that explores the interaction between
a single litigant and a fact-ﬁnder whom we take to be a jury. Both the litigant and the fact-
ﬁnder are sophisticated and rational. The fact-ﬁnder must evaluate a claim being made
by the litigant, which amounts to estimating the value of an underlying state of the world.
The litigant has private unveriﬁable information, described as the litigant’s type. In some
contingencies the litigant also possesses hard evidence and must decide whether to disclose
it, if allowed. The fact-ﬁnder reviews whatever hard evidence is presented, updates its beliefs
about the state (obeying Bayes’ rule), and then issues a ﬁnding in the case. Applications
extend beyond litigation, as we describe below.
In our model, the meaning of hard evidence is endogenous because the fact-ﬁnder must
assess the litigant’s disclosure strategy in order to interpret evidence. We show that con-
structive hard evidence requires the litigant and fact-ﬁnder to have similar beliefs about this
interpretation. In some circumstances, it is possible for beliefs to be out of alignment and, as
a consequence, hard evidence can mislead the fact-ﬁnder and reduce social welfare by more
than the value of evidence. For a court that is sensitive to such a worst-case scenario, which
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we refer to as seeking “robust litigation,” it is optimal to exclude relevant hard evidence
under some conditions.
To delve into the logic, note that hard evidence is, by deﬁnition, statistical in nature:
An individual piece of evidence exists with diﬀerent probabilities in various states of the
world. Hard evidence rarely provides deﬁnitive proof (that is, certainty) that the state is in
some set, but it gives a signal that allows a fact-ﬁnder to update from a prior to a posterior
probability distribution of the state.
Consider, for example, a trial that focuses on the question of whether the defendant
robbed a particular store at 10:00 p.m. on a given date. The defendant may enter into
evidence a time-stamped surveillance video showing him at a stadium 20 miles away at 9:20
p.m. on the same date (the hard evidence in this example). This piece of hard evidence does
not prove with certainty that the defendant is innocent. It is possible that traﬃc conditions
on the day of the crime were such that the defendant could, by leaving the stadium at
9:25 p.m. and speeding through the city, reach the store before 10:00 p.m.1 However, the
defendant’s image on the stadium’s 9:20 p.m. surveillance video is perhaps more likely to
exist in the state of the world in which the defendant did not rob the store than it would in
the state of the world in which he did.
We observe that hard evidence produces information through two channels. The ﬁrst
channel is the exogenous signal provided by the simple existence or nonexistence of the hard
evidence. We call this the face-value signal. The second channel is the signal that disclosure
or nondisclosure of hard evidence provides about the litigant’s private information, and
so we call this the litigant-type signal. The litigant-type signal has an endogenous element
because the fact-ﬁnder’s posterior belief about the litigant’s type depends on the fact-ﬁnder’s
assessment of the litigant’s disclosure strategy (the probability that each type of litigant
would disclose the hard evidence when it exists). It is informative if diﬀerent types of the
litigant would disclose hard evidence with diﬀerent probabilities.
Let us use the robbery sketch described above to illustrate these two channels and to
show how evidence can be misleading. If the jury is assured of seeing the time-stamped
video of the defendant at the stadium whenever such a video exists, then the jury would
extract from its disclosure (or nondisclosure) exactly the face-value signal. In this case,
disclosure of the video would cause the jury to revise upward its probability assessment that
1There may also be errors in the estimate of the time of the robbery and/or the video time stamp.
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the defendant is innocent. But suppose the jury believes that a type of defendant who likely
knows he committed the crime (the “bad type”) would disclose the video evidence with high
probability when it exists, whereas a defendant who knows that he didn’t commit the crime
(the “good type”) would disclose with lower probability. Then disclosure would cause the
jury to update in the direction of the bad type, but it could go the other way if the jury
thought that the good type would be more likely to disclose video evidence.
Because both the face-value and litigant-type signals relate to the underlying state of
interest—here the defendant’s guilt or innocence—the jury combines them when updating
about the state. If the face-value signal is strong compared to the bounds of the defendant-
type signal, then the jury will update toward innocence regardless of the jury’s belief about
the defendant’s strategy. In such a case, the defendant can conclude that disclosure of the
surveillance video is sure to have a positive eﬀect (from the defendant’s point of view) and
both types of defendant surely prefer to disclose, ensuring that the information provided by
the disclosure is exactly the face-value signal.
But if the face-value signal is relatively weak compared to the defendant-type signal, then
disclosure of the surveillance video could lead the jury to update toward either innocence
or guilt, depending on the jury’s belief about the defendant’s disclosure strategy. And then
it is possible—and consistent with rationality—for the good defendant to think the jury
would interpret disclosure as a signal of guilt (the jury believing that only the guilty type
of defendant would disclose), whereas the bad defendant has the opposite belief. Then the
good defendant would not disclose the hard evidence and the bad defendant would disclose.
Importantly, the jury could rationally think only the good defendant would disclose, which
makes the jury update in precisely the wrong direction compared to what would happen if
the jury knew the defendant’s actual strategy. Hard evidence in this case is misleading and
disadvantageous to society.2
To summarize, the example demonstrates that there are circumstances in which both
types of defendant and the jury are sophisticated and rational Bayesians with a common
2The scenario can be embellished further by adding detail about the diﬀerent types of potential defendants
and the choices made by them, law enforcement oﬃcers, and others who inﬂuence whether the crime would
be committed and whom might be charged. For example, one could imagine various types of defendant,
including a sophisticated criminal who meticulously plans to visit the stadium and walk in front of a remote
security camera before racing across town to rob the store. We comment on such “primary activity” in the
next section and in the Conclusion. In this article we take all primary activity to be exogenous, focusing on
the litigant’s strategic disclosure choice and the fact-ﬁnder’s interpretation.
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prior belief about the fundamentals, these facts are common knowledge between them, and
yet hard evidence is misleading to society’s detriment. Notably, this is a non-equilibrium
phenomenon, in that at least one player (or player-type) has an inaccurate belief about the
actual strategy used by others. As we argue in the article, there is good reason to doubt
that the players’ beliefs in the settings studied here would happen to coincide, much less be
coordinated on society’s preferred equilibrium strategy proﬁle. Therefore, our criterion for
welfare analysis is robustness, which is the requirement that the litigation process delivers
the intended (socially desirable) outcomes whether or not the fact-ﬁnder and all types of the
litigant are coordinated on an equilibrium strategy proﬁle.
To evaluate robustness, the solution concept we employ is rationalizability, which iden-
tiﬁes the range of possible outcomes consistent with common knowledge of rationality. The
robustness criterion evaluates policy alternatives by calculating the minimum expected wel-
fare over all rationalizable strategy proﬁles of the litigation game. The main policy choice
that we consider is whether to exclude hard evidence (individual pieces of evidence and/or
bundles) from being presented by the litigant or being considered by the jury. We also com-
ment on policies that would compel hard evidence to be disclosed and policies that would
foster alignment of beliefs.
Our main result identiﬁes conditions under which robust litigation justiﬁes excluding rel-
evant hard evidence because of its potential to mislead the jury. Speciﬁcally, the court should
compare the face-value signal of evidence against the possible litigant-type signal, and ex-
clude evidence when the latter outweighs the former. The model therefore oﬀers support for
the wording of Rule 403, with the term “probative value” taken to mean the face-value signal
of hard evidence, and where “unfair prejudice,” “confusing the issues,” and “misleading the
jury” are possible manifestations of relatively strong litigant-type signaling. So along with
the theoretical results, the modeling exercise herein contributes to the literature by oﬀering
a methodology for modeling statistical hard evidence, particularly in distinguishing between
the face-value signal and the litigant-type signal. The application of a robustness criterion
for legal policy represents a secondary contribution, and along with it the demonstration
that rationalizability is a useful concept for studying robustness. These elements are novel
compared to the related literature, which we discuss at the end of the article.
Although we focus on evidence exclusion at trial, our results have other potential applica-
tions. Admissibility policies are relevant for the wide variety of settings where hard evidence
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is evaluated. For example, in many procurement auctions, principals review collections of
materials (such as design documents, credentials, and other evidence) and award contracts
based on a combination of the bid prices and a calculated score of the other elements. The
selection of candidates for employment works in a similar way. To achieve robust selection
processes in these settings, it may be useful to establish rules that exclude certain kinds of
information from being submitted by bidders/candidates or from being considered by re-
viewers. Financial markets are another example. Whereas much attention has been paid
to mandatory disclosure rules, such as those imposed by the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission, there can also be restrictions on disclosure of potentially misleading informa-
tion. For example, the eﬀects of the August 7, 2018, announcement by Tesla CEO Elon
Musk concerning funding to take the company private likely mixed veriﬁable information
about the company with speculation about what Musk privately knew at the time concern-
ing the company’s ﬁnancial health and ability to achieve production targets. His actions were
deemed illegal and led to a costly settlement with the SEC.3 We argue that, in developing
policies to govern the disclosure of hard evidence, exclusion should be considered alongside
mandatory disclosure.
The following section presents our basic model, which limits attention to a simple setting
with one litigant, a jury that must decide a ﬁnding in the case, and one piece of hard evidence
(which we call the “document”) that the litigant may possess. In Section 3 we provide the
following results: If a litigant has signiﬁcant information about the state beyond what can
be disclosed as hard evidence, then there is a problem of coordination of beliefs and behavior
between the litigant and the jury, and hard evidence is misleading in some rationalizable
outcomes. Further, the potential welfare loss of misleading evidence exceeds the potential
gain of the face-value signal. In contrast, if a litigant’s private information adds little to
what can be disclosed as hard evidence, then there is a unique rationalizable outcome and,
in a setting in which the document is positive evidence of the litigant’s favored state, the
litigant discloses the document whenever it exists. We provide additional details for the
setting in which the litigant’s type and the hard evidence are conditionally independent.
Section 4 discusses implications of the basic model for the courts, including steps that
can help to align beliefs and two policy implications regarding admissibility of hard evidence.
In Section 5 we extend our model to the case of two documents, which allows for an analysis
3See, for example, Michaels and Rapoport (2018).
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of a wider range of evidentiary rules than in the basic model. We show that robust litigation
requires that, under certain conditions, multiple documents should be admissible only as a
bundle. A complication in the analysis is that disclosure of a single document may serve as
both a signal of the litigant’s private information and a signal of whether the other document
exists.
A discussion of how our model and results relate to the law, including a numerical example
based on a well-known case related to Rule 403, is contained in Section 6. We discuss the
related literature in Section 7 and oﬀer concluding remarks in Section 8. There we also
provide some discussion of the setting with two litigants and possible extensions. Proofs of
the theorems and a numerical example for Rule 404 may be found in the Appendices.
2 Basic Model
Description of the Game
We study a simple litigation game with hard evidence. There are two players: the litigant
and the jury. The litigant can be a plaintiﬀ or defendant in a legal case before the court.
The jury is the court-designated fact-ﬁnder whom we model as a single agent. At issue is
an underlying state of the world θ ∈ Θ ≡ {0, 1}, where θ = 0 is called the “low state” and
θ = 1 is the “high state.” The state represents whether the litigant’s claim in the legal case
is true (θ = 1) or false (θ = 0).
The litigant has two sources of information about the state. First, the litigant privately
observes an unveriﬁable signal x ∈ X, where X is some arbitrary ﬁnite set. We occasionally
refer to this signal as the litigant’s “x-type.” Second, the litigant may possess hard evidence,
which is veriﬁable and can be disclosed to the jury. Suppose hard evidence takes the form of
a single document d. We let e ∈ E ≡ {d, ∅} denote the evidentiary state, where e = d means
that the document exists (and the litigant possesses it) and e = ∅ means the document does
not exist.
The players interact as follows. At the beginning of the game, the underlying state θ, the
evidentiary state e, and the private signal x are determined exogenously by nature according
to the joint probability distribution f .4 Neither player observes θ. The litigant privately
4So f(θ, e, x) is the probability that (θ, e, x) is realized. Although it would be appropriate to call the entire
vector (θ, e, x) the state, for simplicity we shall sometimes refer to θ as the state (without the “underlying”
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observes the signal x and the evidentiary state e.
Next, the litigant has an opportunity to present hard evidence to the jury, and there is
a chance that the document, when it exists, will be disclosed exogenously. If e = d then
with probability ψ the document is disclosed exogenously, and with probability 1 − ψ the
litigant has the choice of whether to disclose it or disclose nothing. In the event that e = ∅,
there is no disclosure and the litigant has no choice; this is the deﬁning characteristic of hard
evidence. The parameter ψ captures the idea that the litigant may be inﬂuenced by a lawyer
or other party who induces disclosure of available hard evidence, or that the judge may
intervene to force disclosure. In the latter scenario, the judge would need to independently
detect whether the document exists, so ψ represents the likelihood that the court learns of
the document’s existence and compels disclosure under penalty of contempt.
The jury observes whether d is disclosed but does not observe e or whether disclosure
was due to exogeous forces. Then the jury takes an action a ∈ [0, 1], which in practical
terms is a ﬁnding in the case. This action can represent, for instance, the degree to which
the litigant is held responsible for a crime or the amount of monetary damages to award the
litigant. Findings closer to 1 are more in the litigant’s favor relative to ﬁndings closer to 0.
We assume that the jury has society’s preferences, given by the payoﬀ function uJ(a, θ) =
−(a − θ)2. This implies that the jury’s optimal action is equal to its posterior probability
of the high state, after updating on the basis of whatever hard evidence was disclosed. We
assume that the litigant’s payoﬀ is given by uL(a, θ) = a, so the litigant’s interest is to act
in whatever fashion will maximize the jury’s posterior probability of θ = 1.5
A mixed (behavior) strategy for the litigant is given by a function β :X → [0, 1], where
for each x ∈ X, β(x) is the probability that the litigant chooses to disclose the document
in the event that e = d and his private signal is x. Due to the possibility of exogenous
disclosure, the total probability of disclosure is thus given by σ(x) ≡ ψ + (1− ψ)β(x). Note
that choosing β is equivalent to choosing σ :X → [ψ, 1]. Because it will be convenient in
our analysis to deal directly with σ, we shall therefore refer to σ as the litigant’s strategy,
qualiﬁer) because this is what is of direct interest to the jury.
5For simplicity, we assume that the litigant cares only about the jury’s action. We could allow uL to be a
function of the state, the litigant’s private signal, the realization of hard evidence, and whether the litigant
discloses the document, but such ingredients are not necessary for the logical connections that we focus on.
We could also model the jury as having only two available actions, such as ﬁnding the litigant guilty or not
guilty, and obtain much the same analysis if the jury is inﬂuenced by a noisy information source in addition
to the information received from the litigant’s dosclosure choice.
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with the understanding that σ(x) ≥ ψ for every x. We assume that ψ ∈ [0, 1), so ψ = 0 is
allowed.
Assume that the foregoing description is common knowledge between the players. To
recap, in this incomplete-information game an exogenous random draw determines (θ, e, x).
The litigant obtains e and also observes x. Then, if e = d, disclosure of d occurs exogenously
with probability ψ and otherwise the litigant decides whether to disclose d. Finally, the jury
observes only whether d is disclosed, forms its posterior belief about the state θ, and selects
its action a.
Regarding notation, we will sometimes evaluate f over sets. For example, we write
expressions such as f(θ, e,K) for K ⊂ X, which is the probability that the underlying state
is θ, the evidentiary state is e, and the private signal is an element of K. Let r ≡ f(1, E,X)
denote the marginal probability that the underlying state is high and assume that r ∈ (0, 1).
It will sometimes be useful to write the probability of e and x conditional on θ, which is
given by the standard conditional-probability formula:
f(e, x | θ) ≡ f(θ, e, x)
f(θ, E,X)
.
We shall assume that f(Θ, d,X) ∈ (0, 1) and that f(Θ, d, x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. We also
assume that f(d, x | 1) 	= f(d, x | 0) for some x, for otherwise hard evidence conveys no
information.
A Note on Litigant Types and Primary Activity
Our model describes a strategic situation between a litigant and jury, conditional on the case
being in court. To analyze a real-world application, it can be helpful to describe how events
that would lead to a court case imply the distribution f . Developing the context, we see
that diﬀerent types of litigant in our model are typically diﬀerent people in the real world.
For instance, consider the following simple story about the events leading to a court case.
There are a variety of individuals in society, diﬀering in their propensity to commit a crime
and, if so, how to go about it. Their behavior and some exogenous random forces lead to
an outcome of preliminary activity, which includes whether and how a crime is committed,
evidence relevant to the crime, and the detainment by the police of an individual who is
brought to trial. It is possible that this defendant—the litigant in our model—is a legitimate
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suspect but actually did not commit the crime, just as it is possible that the defendant did in
fact commit the crime. These two types of defendant are diﬀerent people in the society and
their personal backgrounds are, to the extent not observable to law enforcement, captured
in the x variable.
If the question before the jury is whether the defendant’s culpability exceeds a partic-
ular evidentiary standard, and if the defendant has some understanding about whether he
performed a criminal act, then a component of x is correlated with θ but is not necessar-
ily perfectly correlated. That is, the defendant may have information about whether he is
culpable but not know precisely whether his behavior exceeds the cutoﬀ for a guilty verdict
or for a particular sentence. For instance, the litigant may lack an understanding of the
law or be unsure of whether his behavior was criminal. If, in this example, the defendant
knows precisely whether he or she committed the crime and this is the question that the
jury considers, then a component of x would be perfectly correlated with θ.
Consideration of the social backdrop also demonstrates how natural it is for there to be
correlation between e and x, conditional on the underlying state θ. Take the store robbery
example in the Introduction and suppose d denotes the litigant (defendant) being on the
recording of the stadium security camera at a time that would make it challenging for him
to have traveled to the store and committed the robbery. Suppose that X is partitioned
into four subsets representing four diﬀerent groups of people in the society: I, I ′, G, and
G′. Types in I and I ′ would never commit a criminal act and those in I happen to be on
the stadium video, types in G are sophisticated criminals who plan to make an appearance
in front of the camera at the stadium before racing to the store to commit the crime, and
types in G′ are naive criminals who would commit the crime on the spur of the moment and
would not be on the stadium video. Assume that x is randomly drawn, the crime occurs
if x ∈ G ∪ G′, and there is some randomness in police work so that with some probability
an innocent person is the one brought to trial. Then, along with the x already deﬁned, we
have θ = 1 if x ∈ I ∪ I ′ and θ = 0 otherwise. The video evidence exists, so that e = d, if
x ∈ I ∪G. The distribution f is then deﬁned from the distribution of x and the randomness
induced by the police work to identify a suspect, conditional on a crime occurring. In this
example, x and e are correlated overall and they are correlated conditional on θ.
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Solution Concept
We shall analyze the litigation game using the solution concept of rationalizability, which
assumes it is common knowledge that the players form beliefs about each other and best
respond to their beliefs. The set of rationalizable strategy proﬁles contains all of the proﬁles
consistent with this assumption. For ψ > 0 both of the jury’s information sets in the game
are always reached with positive probability, so standard normal-form rationalizability suf-
ﬁces. In the setting of ψ = 0, with some strategy proﬁles the jury’s no-disclosure information
set is not reached. For this setting, technically we are characterizing extensive-form rational-
izability and we add the assumption that the players’ beliefs are plainly consistent (Watson
2017), which implies Bayes’-rule updating and some structure on the jury’s belief at the
no-disclosure information set as described below. Importantly, in a rationalizable outcome
it is not necessarily the case that one player’s beliefs are accurate about the other player’s
beliefs and behavior. Depending on parameters, there may be a rationalizable outcome in
which the litigant has an incorrect belief about the jury’s reasoning, or vice versa.
The rationalizability concept is appropriate for settings in which the litigant and jury lack
experience in dealing with each other, and where the legal institution and social norms would
not be expected to completely coordinate the litigant’s and jury’s beliefs and behavior. For
example, a signiﬁcant fraction of civil and criminal cases feature a litigant who has had little
previous experience in court and who has not faced the same circumstances before. Most
jurors also have limited experience in fact-ﬁnding. These players may be able to engage in
sophisticated reasoning and understand each other’s incentives and rationality, but still not
be fully coordinated.
With the rationalizability concept, we do not require the beliefs of diﬀerent types of
litigant to be the same. Indeed, we think it is important to allow for non-aligned types,
whereby the litigant’s beliefs may depend on his private signal and hard evidence. The main
justiﬁcation for this is that, as noted already, the various litigant x-types typically refer to
diﬀerent people in a population, and there is no reason to believe that diﬀerent people have
exactly the same beliefs. Non-aligned types will play an important role in our theory.
Much of our analysis will be put in terms of the jury’s posterior belief regarding the state,
conditioned on whether the document is disclosed. Let b(d) denote the posterior probability
of the high state in the event that d is disclosed and let b(∅) be the probability of the high
state in the event that d is not disclosed. These values deﬁne the jury’s interpretation of hard
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evidence. It is important to recognize that b(d) and b(∅) depend on the jury’s belief about
the litigant’s strategy σ, as well as the jury’s understanding of the information system.
The jury’s initial belief (at the beginning of the game) about the litigant’s strategy is
given by a function λ :X → [ψ, 1], where for each x ∈ X, λ(x) is the probability with which
the jury thinks the document is disclosed in the event that e = d and the litigant’s private
signal is x. We can determine the jury’s posterior beliefs in terms of λ and the fundamentals
of the model. Note that f(1, e, x) = rf(e, x |1) and f(0, e, x) = (1− r)f(e, x |0). If λ(x) > 0
for some x, then the jury’s posterior belief conditional on disclosure is given by Bayes’ rule:
b(d) =
∑
x∈X rf(d, x |1)λ(x)∑
x∈X [rf(d, x |1) + (1− r)f(d, x |0)]λ(x)
. (1)
Note that the denominator is strictly positive if and only if λ(x) > 0 for some x, because we
have assumed that f(Θ, d, x) > 0 for all x ∈ X. Clearly ψ > 0 is a suﬃcient condition.
In the case of λ(x) = 0 for all x, which is possible only in the setting where ψ = 0,
the denominator is zero and Bayes’ rule overall does not apply. However, as we show in
Appendix A, plain consistency implies that Equation 1 must still hold with λ replaced by
another function λ′ that describes the jury’s updated belief about the litigant’s strategy.
Thus, Equation 1 shall always be valid, with the understanding that λ may refer to an
updated belief about σ.
We have a similar Bayes’ rule expression for the jury’s posterior belief conditional on
nondisclosure. It is always valid for the jury’s initial belief about the litigant’s strategy,
because we have assumed that with positive probability the document does not exist.
As noted already, the jury’s optimal action is to match its posterior belief about the
state, so it selects a = b(d) in the event that the document is disclosed and a = b(∅) if
the document is not disclosed. Likewise, the litigant’s optimal strategy depends on each
type’s belief about the jury’s strategy. For any given type of the litigant, this type optimally
discloses the document if, according to his beliefs, the expected action of the jury conditional
on disclosure weakly exceeds the expected action of the jury conditional on nondisclosure. To
express this condition in terms of the jury’s beliefs, a litigant type weakly prefers disclosure
if, according to his belief, the expected b(d) is weakly greater than the expected b(∅). A
litigant type optimally withholds the document if his expected b(d) is weakly below his
expected b(∅).
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Welfare and Admissibility
Social welfare is measured by the jury’s actual payoﬀ. We will take the expectation with
respect to the distribution f , calling this the expected actual payoﬀ of the jury. Note that
this may diﬀer from the expected payoﬀ in the mind of the jury, because what the jury
expects and what actually happens may diﬀer in a rationalizable outcome.
There are two key elements of welfare analysis. First, we want to identify whether hard
evidence is useful in the litigation process, in terms of raising the jury’s actual payoﬀ, and
we want to quantify the extent to which hard evidence can function in a misleading way
that lowers welfare. Second, we investigate the design of admissibility rules with a goal of
robust litigation, which is to ﬁnd rules that ensure hard evidence plays a constructive role
in the litigation process.
The face-value signal of the hard evidence is the marginal signal provided by the existence
or nonexistence of the document, averaging over the litigant’s private signal x. If f(d,X |
1) > f(d,X |0) then we say that the document is positive evidence of the high state and the
absence of the document is negative evidence of the low state (Bull and Watson, 2004). If
f(d,X | 1) < f(d,X | 0) then we say the opposite—the document is positive evidence of the
low state.6
On the welfare front, we use the following notation. Let U∗J denote the jury’s expected
payoﬀ in an artiﬁcial setting in which the jury directly observes whether the document
exists (but does not observe x), forms the proper posterior belief, and best responds. Let U0J
denote the jury’s expected payoﬀ in an artiﬁcial setting without hard evidence, where the
jury must choose a without interacting with the litigant. Then U∗J − U0J is the face value of
hard evidence, in other words the welfare gain due to the face-value signal provided by hard
evidence.
Let us say that hard evidence is ineﬀective if the litigant plays a strategy other than full
disclosure (σ = 1), because in such a case the jury does not always see the document when
it exists and therefore is unable to beneﬁt fully from its face-value signal. Further, let bσ(d)
and bσ(∅) be the jury’s posterior probabilities under the assumption that the jury knows
the litigant’s actual strategy (and so λ = σ), where we recognize that the former is deﬁned
6Extreme cases of absolute proof are given by f(d,X | 1) = 1 and f(d,X | 0) = 0, where disclosure of d
proves that the state is high, and f(d,X | 1) = 0 and f(d,X | 0) = 1, where disclosure of d proves that the
state is low. Another extreme has f(d,X | 1) = f(d,X | 0) = 1, which is the case of a cheap document, but
the assumptions made already rule this out.
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only if σ(x) > 0 for some x. Then we say that hard evidence is misleading if bσ(d) is well
deﬁned and yet b(d) 	= bσ(d) and/or b(∅) 	= bσ(∅), so that the jury’s posterior beliefs are not
consistent with the litigant’s actual strategy.
Finally, let UJ denote the lowest expected actual payoﬀ of the jury over the rationalizable
outcomes of our litigation game, so that U∗J − UJ is the potential welfare loss due to hard
evidence being ineﬀective or misleading. The potential loss ratio is deﬁned to be the ratio
L =
U∗J − UJ
U∗J − U0J
.
Note that L ≥ 0. If we replace UJ with the jury’s expected actual payoﬀ, then L becomes
the actual loss ratio.
3 Conditions For Misleading Hard Evidence
Whether hard evidence can turn out to be ineﬀective or misleading depends on the strength
of the litigant’s private signal relative to the strength of the hard evidence. To explore the
connection, let us examine the possibilities for b(d) relative to r. Deﬁne:
K+ ≡ {x ∈ X |f(d, x |1) ≥ f(d, x |0)} and K− ≡ {x ∈ X |f(d, x |1) ≤ f(d, x |0)}.
Note that K+ is the set of litigant x-types for which the combination of the occurance of x
and existence of the document is weakly positive evidence of θ = 1, whereas K− is the set
of litigant x-types for which the combination of the occurrence of the type and existence of
the document is weakly positive evidence of θ = 0. The following conditions compare these
combination signals to the face-value signal of the hard evidence:
(D) K− 	= ∅ and ψ [f(d,X |1)− f(d,X |0)] ≤ (1− ψ) [f(d,K− |0)− f(d,K− |1)]
(U) K+ 	= ∅ and ψ [f(d,X |1)− f(d,X |0)] ≥ (1− ψ) [f(d,K+ |0)− f(d,K+ |1)].
The bracketed term on the left side of each of these inequalities is the strength of the
document’s face-value signal; this term is greater than zero if d is positive evidence of the
high state and less than zero if it is positive evidence of the low state. Similarly, the bracketed
terms on the right side of these inequalities give the strength of the combination signal for the
x-types in K− and K+, where the K− term is nonnegative and the K+ term is nonpositive.
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We use the letters “D” and “U” in reference to these conditions because, as the following
lemma shows, the ﬁrst relates to whether the jury can revise its belief about the state
downward conditional on disclosure of d, and the second relates to upward revision. Let us
call λ “feasible” if it is a function λ :X → [ψ, 1] satisfying λ(x) > 0 for some x.
Lemma 1: Let b(d) be given by Equation 1. Condition D holds if and only if there is a
feasible λ such that b(d) ≤ r. Likewise, Condition U holds if and only if there is a feasible λ
such that b(d) ≥ r.
Proof: Let us deﬁne beliefs λ+ and λ− as follows:
λ+(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if x ∈ K+
ψ if x ∈ X\K+
and λ−(x) =
⎧⎨
⎩
1 if x ∈ K−
ψ if x ∈ X\K−
.
Let us write b(d) ≤ r using Equation 1 to substitute for b(d), and then rewrite the expression
by substituting f(d, x | θ)λ(x) = f(d, x | θ)ψ + f(d, x | θ)(λ(x) − ψ). Factoring and dividing
by (1− r) produces the following inequality:
ψ [f(d,X |1)− f(d,X |0)] ≤
∑
x∈X
[f(d, x |0)− f(d, x |1)] (λ(x)− ψ) . (2)
Clearly λ− maximizes the right side of Inequality 2 by choice of λ :X → [ψ, 1]. Plugging in
λ− yields the inequality of Condition D.
Therefore, if for some feasible λ we have b(d) ≤ r, then λ satisﬁes Inequality 2 and this
further implies the inequality in Condition D. The existence of such a λ also implies K− 	= ∅.
We verify this using a contradiction argument. If K− = ∅ and ψ > 0 then the left side of
Inequality 2 is strictly positive, so the right side must also be strictly positive, implying that
f(d, x |0) > f(d, x |1) for some x (contradicting K− = ∅). If K− = ∅ and ψ = 0 then the left
side of Inequality 2 is zero, and so the right side is nonnegative. But then by feasibility of λ
we must have λ(x) > 0 for some x, and this implies that f(d, x | 0) ≥ f(d, x | 1) for some x
(again contradicting K− = ∅). To prove the converse relation, observe that if Condition D
holds, then λ− is feasible and satisﬁes Inequality 2.
The relation b(d) ≥ r is equivalent to the reverse of Inequality 2. Repeating the argument
above for K+ and λ+ establishes the second claim of the lemma. 
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For intuition, observe that if the document is positive evidence of the low state, so that
f(d,X | 1) ≤ f(d,X | 0), then Condition D trivially holds. If the document is strictly
positive evidence of the high state, where f(d,X | 1) > f(d,X | 0), then the inequality for
Condition D requires that this face-value signal can be oﬀset by evidence of the low state in
the form of the existence of the document in combination with an x-type in K−. Likewise,
if f(d,X | 1) ≥ f(d,X | 0) then Condition U trivially holds. Otherwise, the inequality of
Condition U requires that the x-types in K+, in combination with the document existing,
provide suﬃciently strong positive evidence of the high state.
It is not diﬃcult to verify that Conditions D and U are both satisﬁed if (i) the docu-
ment exists with strictly positive probability in both underlying states, (ii) ψ is suﬃciently
small, and (iii) the litigant’s private signal provides a suﬃciently accurate indication of the
underlying state. Suppose, for instance, that the litigant precisely knows the state. In the
example of a criminal trial, this would mean that the defendant knows perfectly whether
his culpability exceeds the threshold for guilt. Then K+ is the set of x-types that know
the state is high and K− are the x-types that know the state is low, so f(d,K+ | 1) > 0,
f(d,K+ | 0) = 0, f(d,K− | 0) > 0, and f(d,K− | 1) = 0. In this case, the inequalities
of Conditions D and U trivially follow for a small enough value of ψ. This is an extreme
example. Real litigants would generally not know the underlying state perfectly because of
uncertainty regarding standards of proof and the law.
It is exactly when Conditions D and U are both satisﬁed that there are rationalizable
outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading. The root cause is miscoordination between
the players’ beliefs and behavior. For example, take the setting in which the litigant is a
defendant who knows his culpability. Suppose a guilty litigant (with x ∈ K−) believes that
the jury’s posteriors satisfy b(d) ≥ r as Condition U allows; we show in the proof of Theorem 1
below that this implies r ≥ b(∅) as well. Suppose further that an innocent litigant (with
x ∈ K+) has the opposite belief, thinking that b(d) ≤ b(∅) as Condition D allows. Both kinds
of beliefs are rational because they are consistent with feasible beliefs and proper updating
by the jury. These beliefs would lead the guilty litigant to disclose the document and the
innocent litigant to not disclose. Further suppose that the jury actually believes that the
innocent x-type would disclose and the guilty x-type would not disclose. Then the jury gets
the hard evidence signal backward and evidence is misleading. Importantly, every x-type
of litigant and the jury are behaving rationally and fully incorporate the rationality of the
16
other player-types, so the outcome is rationalizable.
Lemma 1 leads to the following general result on conditions for misleading or ineﬀective
hard evidence.
Theorem 1: If Condition U fails, then the unique rationalizable outcome has every litigant
type disclosing d at minimum probability ψ, the actual loss ratio is L ∈ (0, 1], and hard
evidence is ineﬀective. If Condition D fails, then the unique rationalizable outcome has the
litigant disclosing d whenever he has it, the actual loss ratio is L = 0, and hard evidence is
eﬀective.7 If Conditions D and U are both satisﬁed, then the potential loss ratio is L > 1
and there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading.
To explore the scope of the third case, where Conditions D and U both hold, consider
equilibrium outcomes as a benchmark. Under Conditions D and U, if additionally f(d,X |
1) < f(d,X | 0), then every perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the litigation game features
minimal disclosure, so hard evidence is ineﬀective and the actual loss ratio is in the interval
(0, 1]. In the subcase where f(d,X |1) > f(d,X |0) and ψ > 0, the unique perfect Bayesian
equilibrium features full disclosure and the actual loss ratio is 0. Finally, if f(d,X | 1) >
f(d,X | 0) and ψ = 0, and assuming K− 	= ∅, then there are multiple perfect Bayesian
equilibria, including ones in which the document is never disclosed (so the actual loss ratio is
1) and one in which the document is always disclosed (with an actual loss ratio of 0). Overall,
in an equilibrium there is no misleading evidence and the loss ratio is always between 0 and 1.
But regardless of the subcase of f , there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence
is misleading and the loss level strictly exceeds 1, so welfare falls strictly below what can be
achieved in any equilibrium.8
The conditions for misleading evidence are particularly simple in the setting in which
e and x are conditionally independent. For this setting, let qθ denote the probability that
e = d conditional on θ, and let pθ(x) denote the probability that the litigant’s private
7Although rationalizability assumes common knowledge of rational behavior, to prove the ﬁrst two claims
we need only that players are rational (best responding to their beliefs) and know this about each other.
8See Watson (2017) for the perfect Bayesian equilibrium deﬁnition, which is equivalent to sequential
equilibrium for the game studied here. The equilibrium benchmark also is helpful in motivating the prospect
of miscoordinated beliefs and behavior. Suppose that ψ = 0 and f(d,X |1) > f(d,X |0). Then the various
types of litigant and the jury could all believe that they are playing a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the
litigation game, but they may not have the same equilibrium in mind. For instance, one type of litigant
may behave according to an equilibrium in which the document is never disclosed, while another behaves
according to an equilibrium in which the document is always disclosed. Whatever equilibrium the jury thinks
is being played, evidence will turn out to be misleading.
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Figure 1: Parameter regions for misleading evidence.
signal is x conditional on θ. Thus f(d, x | θ) = qθpθ(x) and qθ = f(d,X | θ). Recall that
q1/q0 < 1 means that d is positive evidence of the low state, the opposite inequality means
d is positive evidence of the high state, and pushing this ratio farther from 1 represents a
stronger face-value signal.
Theorem 2: Suppose that hard evidence e and private signal x are independent conditional
on the underlying state θ. There are functions γ : [0, 1] → (0, 1] and γ : [0, 1] → [1,∞),
which depend on the distributions p1(·) and p0(·), with the following properties. For any
given ψ, Condition D is equivalent to q1/q0 ≤ γ(ψ) and Condition U is equivalent to
q1/q0 ≥ γ(ψ). Furthermore, γ is increasing in ψ, γ is decreasing in ψ, γ(1) = γ(1) = 1,
γ(0) ≡ max
x∈X
p0(x)/p1(x), and γ(0) ≡ min
x∈X
p0(x)/p1(x).
Note that γ(0) and γ(0) are the maximum and minimum of the likelihood ratio (low
state to high state) of the litigant’s private signal realizations. They provide bounds on the
highest and lowest posterior probability that the litigant can have about the low state based
on only his private signal. Thus, in the case of ψ = 0, the conditions for misleading evidence
come down to a straightforward comparison between the likelihood ratio of the face-value
signal and the maximum and minimum likelihood ratios of the litigant’s private signal.
Overall, when the face-value signal of hard evidence is strong relative to the litigant’s
private signal, there is no concern of misleading evidence. If in addition the document
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is positive evidence of the high state, then hard evidence is eﬀective because the litigant
always discloses it. However, when the information provided by the private signal is strong
relative to the face-value signal of hard evidence, then there is scope for the evidence to
be misleading, with the welfare loss exceeding the welfare gain of the face-value signal.
The scope for misleading evidence shrinks as ψ increases. These ﬁndings are illustrated in
Figure 1 for the setting in which e and x are conditionally independent.
Although it may be useful to determine how changes in parameter values aﬀect L, unfor-
tunately calculating the potential loss is diﬃcult and we cannot provide a clean comparative-
statics result. However, one can uncover a property of L for parameter values near the cutoﬀ
for robust litigation, and the news is not so good. Speciﬁcally, for parameters close to the
region of robust litigation, the potential loss ratio is bounded away from 1.
Theorem 3: Fixing ψ, suppose that hard evidence e and private signal x are independent
conditional on the underlying state θ and that γ(ψ) < γ(ψ). Let q1 be bounded away from
0 by a ﬁxed number. Then there is a number L > 1 so that, for all q0 and q1 satisfying
γ(ψ) ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ(ψ), the potential loss ratio satisﬁes L ≥ L.
4 Implications for Courts
The prospect of misleading evidence is, in our view, an appreciable problem that the legal
system should address. Litigants and juries arrive in court typically having little experience
with similar settings and with each other; so, lacking an institution that would coordinate
them, there is little reason to expect that their beliefs and behavior would be aligned.9 Even
if some measure of coordination could be achieved, theory does not provide much hope that
the parties will coordinate on society’s preferred outcome.10 Importantly, the legal system
actually does address the issue of misleading evidence, as we noted in the Introduction and
discuss further in Section 6.
9In fact, the jury-selection process typically ensures that jurors have not had prior interaction with the
litigants.
10Standard equilibrium reﬁnements do not restrict the equilibrium outcomes. The intuitive criterion (Cho
and Kreps 1987) has no bite in the basic model. The divinity criterion (Banks and Sobel 1987) has no bite
in the slightly more general model in which the litigant’s preferences can depend on the state and there is a
small cost of disclosure; for instance, the litigant’s marginal value of the court’s action is slightly higher in
the low state than in the high state.
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Our modeling exercise suggests that, when developing evidentiary policies, the legal sys-
tem should strive to achieve robust litigation. Robustness means looking at all rationalizable
outcomes, in particular the worst-case scenarios for society, with the recognition that parties’
beliefs and behavior may not be coordinated even though it is common knowledge that they
are rational. We next discuss three options for policy, all having some bearing on reality.
The ﬁrst policy option is for the court to be transparent regarding its interpretive rules,
meaning that it articulates standards for how some common evidentiary actions should be
interpreted. This may help to align the beliefs of the various litigant x-types and also put
them into alignment with the jury’s beliefs. However, projecting complete transparency will
typically be impossible because of the great many contingencies that the court would have to
explain before litigation commences in a given case. Further, such an intervention assumes
that the court fully understands the background of each case and has the jury’s knowledge
about the statistical details of evidence, which voids the function of the jury as fact-ﬁnder.
In a related vein, experienced attorneys may help align the beliefs of the litigant types,
in particular if they represent a variety of types in similar cases and give consistent advice
to these clients. One may even argue that some decisions regarding evidence disclosure are
eﬀectively made by the attorneys. But however assertive attorneys may be, litigants still
have strategic choices about whether to make their attorneys aware of hard evidence and
other information. Therefore, we would not expect beliefs to be completely aligned across
litigant types. Further, an attorney’s plan for trial may be inﬂuenced by the details of the
case and the composition of the jury, and this plan could be correlated with the litigant
type.
Although an experienced attorney may push litigant types toward alignment, it is much
less likely that a jury, whose members rarely hear cases, would have coordinated beliefs.
In fact, even if the beliefs of the litigant types are actually aligned, evidence can still be
misleading so long as the jury may entertain the possibility of non-aligned types. To be
precise, under Conditions D and U when hard evidence is allowed, there are rationalizable
outcomes in which the litigant types have aligned beliefs, evidence is misleading, and the
loss ratio L strictly exceeds 1.11
11For instance, suppose that the document is positive evidence of θ = 1. If the jury believes that types in
K+ would not disclose the document, whereas types in X \K+ would disclose, the jury’s posterior beliefs
satisfy b(d) < b(∅). If, with aligned beliefs, all litigant types disclose the document, then hard evidence is
providing its full face-value signal and yet the jury updates in the opposite direction.
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The second policy option is to compel the litigant to disclose hard evidence under some
conditions. In terms of the model, such a legal rule would have the eﬀect of raising the param-
eter ψ, which is unambiguously good for society given the robustness criterion.12 However,
recall that enforcing mandatory disclosure requires the court to directly determine whether
the document exists, without relying on the litigant for this information. For many kinds
of evidence, the judge would have no way to do this at low cost, even in an inquisitorial
system. Still, there are cases in which it is possible to enforce mandatory disclosure. For
example, mandatory disclosure may be possible for a standard document that the court is
familiar with.13
Policy Implication 1: The court should impose a mandatory disclosure policy for a docu-
ment that the court knows to be relevant, is free to produce, and whose existence or nonex-
istence the court can independently verify.
The third policy option is to establish admissibility rules, which explicitly disallow disclo-
sure of certain kinds of hard evidence. These rules may be imposed in two ways. The court
could simply refuse to allow the document to be presented in some cases. Alternatively, the
court could instruct the jury to treat disclosure or lack thereof as providing no information
whatsoever.
Our model provides a justiﬁcation for excluding evidence under some conditions. The
criteria for admissibility can be expressed in terms of the potential loss measure and the
nature of the document (whether it is positive evidence of the high state or the low state).
Let us assume that ψ is optimally set, as high as possible, for a given case. Then, seeking
robust litigation, the court optimally makes the document d inadmissible if L is large, in
12Any welfare level that can be achieved for some value ψ must also be achievable for a lower value ψ′.
For instance, suppose that in the setting of ψ, both disclosure and nondisclosure can be rationalized for two
rational beliefs of the litigant. Then these two beliefs still rationalize disclosure and nondisclosure under
ψ′, and this implies that the corresponding set of rational beliefs for the jury includes all of the beliefs that
were rational under ψ. Intuitively, raising ψ decreases the potential loss ratio by reducing the range of other
parameters under which evidence may be misleading (tightening the inequalities for Conditions D and U).
Raising ψ also directly increases the minimum probability on evidence disclosure, which is particularly
beneﬁcial if the document is positive evidence of the low state (where in equilibrium, for example, the
litigant discloses at the minimum probability).
13In some cases it is known that documentation exists to verify or disprove a claim, such as the amount
τ that a person paid in income taxes. The relevant issue may be whether τ ≥ m for a speciﬁc value m, and
so the “document” in our model would a tax receipt that shows τ ≥ m. But it may be known that there
always exists a tax receipt, which implies that if the document showing τ ≥ m does not exist, then there
exists a document showing τ < m. By requiring the litigant to disclose a tax receipt, the court would be
making disclosure of the “τ ≥ m” document mandatory.
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particular greater than 1. If d is positive evidence of the high state (the case in which
eﬀective evidence may be achieved with coordinated beliefs), then the threshold on L could
be increased to the extent that society can tolerate the risk of misleading evidence or the
judge predicts that beliefs and behavior will be well coordinated. This reasoning does not
extend to the setting in which d is positive evidence of the low state, because there evidence
is ineﬀective with coordinated beliefs.
The admissibility test can be restated in terms of the standard notion of relevance,
deﬁned as the strength of the document’s face-value signal. Consider the setting in which
e and x are conditionally independent. Here, a change in parameter values that causes
q1/q0 to move closer to 1 represents a decrease in relevance. Evidence may be misleading if
γ(ψ) ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ(ψ), which is precisely when the evidence is mildly relevant in relation to
the litigant’s private signal and ψ.
Policy Implication 2: To ensure robust use of evidence in litigation, the court must make
hard evidence inadmissible when it is mildly relevant in relation to the litigant’s private,
unveriﬁable information. The court may relax the margin for admissibility if evidence would
tend to favor the litigant’s interests and if there is reason to believe that the litigant’s and
jury’s beliefs will be in concert.
5 A Setting with Multiple Documents
Extending the model to include multiple documents adds another layer of possible inference,
as disclosure of one document or a set of documents could be interpreted as providing
information about the existence or nonexistence of documents that were not disclosed. In
this section we consider a setting with two documents and we explore the implications
of restricting the litigant’s disclosure options. We show that, for some parameter values,
requiring the litigant to bundle documents leads to robust litigation whereas litigation is not
robust without this constraint.
Consider an extension of our model with documents d1 and d2. There are four evidentiary
states, which we represent in terms of subsets of documents: E = {∅, {d1}, {d2}, {d1, d2}},
where e = ∅ means no documents exist, e = {dk} means only document dk exists (k = 1
or k = 2), and e = {d1, d2} means documents d1 and d2 both exist. The litigant is able to
disclose only documents that exist; for instance, in the event that e = {d1}, the litigant can
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only disclose d1 or disclose nothing. Thus, in evidentiary state e, the litigant can select any
e′ ⊂ e to disclose. In some expressions, instead of writing “e = {dk}” and “e = {d1, d2},” we
will write “e = dk” and “e = d1d2” for convenience.
Let us assume, for simplicity, that existence of the documents and the realization of the
litigant’s private signal x are all conditionally independent given the state θ. Further assume
that ψ = 0. Let pθ(x) be the probability that the private signal is x given the state θ, let q1θ
be the probability that d1 exists given θ, and let q2θ be the probability that d2 exists given
θ. Then, for instance, we have f(d1, x |θ) = q1θ(1− q2θ)p1(x) and f(d1d2, x |θ) = q1θq2θp1(x).
We shall focus on the setting in which the two documents are positive evidence of the high
state, so throughout this section we maintain the assumption that q11 > q10 and q21 > q20.
Let λe′(x, e) be the probability that the jury assigns to the litigant disclosing e
′ ⊂ e in
the event that the evidentiary state is e and the litigant’s private signal is x. The jury’s
posterior belief about the state conditional on disclosure of e′, which we denote b(e′), is given
by:
b(e′) =
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
rf(e, x |1)λe′(x, e)
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
rf(e, x |1)λe′(x, e) +
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
(1− r)f(e, x |0)λe′(x, e)
. (3)
Here λ is the jury’s initial belief about the litigant’s strategy or, in the case that this belief
makes the denominator zero, λ is an arbitrary updated belief (as plain consistency requires).
As before, let σ denote the litigant’s strategy. For each evidentiary state e ∈ E, every
private signal x ∈ X, and each e′ ⊂ e, we deﬁne σe′(x, e) to be the probability that the
litigant discloses e′ when he possesses evidence e and receives private signal x. We use the
term “full disclosure” to describe the litigant’s strategy that always discloses every existing
document. Let bσ(e′) be the posterior probability from Equation 3 when we set λ = σ, where
we recognize that this is deﬁned only if σe′(x, e) > 0 for some x and e satisfying f(Θ, e, x) > 0.
The notions of misleading hard evidence and eﬀective hard evidence carry over from the basic
model. For instance, hard evidence is misleading if there exists a disclosure e′ ∈ E such that
bσ(e′) is well deﬁned and yet b(e′) 	= bσ(e′).
We generalize the deﬁnitions of potential and actual loss ratios here, to allow various
comparisons with regard to restrictions on the submission of evidence. Let δ denote a
disclosure policy, which speciﬁes the sets of documents that are allowed to be disclosed,
with the empty set assumed to be included. For instance, one possible policy is δBundle =
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{∅, {d1, d2}}, which means that the litigant is allowed to disclose only nothing (∅) or both
documents (d1d2). A disclosure policy δ implies a restricted game, in which the litigant’s
actions are limited to the options in δ.
Let U∗J (δ) denote the jury’s expected payoﬀ in an artiﬁcial setting in which the jury
directly observes the maximal allowed disclosure of available documents (but does not observe
x), forms the proper posterior belief, and best responds.14 Let UJ(δ) denote the lowest
expected actual payoﬀ of the jury in a rationalizable outcome of the litigation game in which
the litigant is restricted to disclosures in the set δ.
We can compare two disclosure policies, δ and δ′, where δ′ is a subset of δ. Note that
U∗J (δ)−U∗J (δ′) is the face value of the additional hard evidence allowed in δ, which is nonneg-
ative because policy δ allows more disclosure sets. The loss possible under δ is U∗J (δ)−UJ(δ)
and the loss possible under δ′ is U∗J (δ
′)− UJ(δ′), so the diﬀerence is the potential additional
welfare loss due to the allowance of more disclosure sets under δ. The potential loss ratio is
deﬁned as
L(δ, δ′) =
U∗J (δ)− UJ(δ)− [U∗J (δ′)− UJ(δ′)]
U∗J (δ)− U∗J (δ′)
.
When applied to the basic, single-document model with δ = {∅, {d}} and δ′ = {∅}, this
measure is equivalent to the loss ratio L deﬁned earlier.
Conditions for Misleading Hard Evidence
The following results provide conditions for eﬀective and misleading hard evidence. First,
we have conditions guaranteeing full disclosure, so that all hard evidence is eﬀective. Let
δFull = {∅, {d1}, {d2}, {d1d2}} and let δ0 = {∅}. The deﬁnition of γ is unchanged from the
basic model with ψ = 0; that is, γ(0) = max
x∈X
p0(x)/p1(x).
Theorem 4: Suppose that there are no limits on disclosure (the δFull disclosure policy) and
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) > γ and
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) > γ.
14For the policy δ = {∅, {d1}, {d2}}, the maximal disclosure is not well deﬁned in the event that e = d1d2.
We will not consider this policy here. In a general model, one might make the assumption that all policies
under consideration are closed with respect to unions, so that if d1 and d2 can be disclosed individually,
then disclosure of d1d2 is also allowed. An interesting question is whether such a restriction has merit on
eﬃciency grounds.
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Then the only rationalizable outcome entails full disclosure, the actual loss ratio comparing
δFull to δ0 is L(δFull, δ0) = 0, and hard evidence is eﬀective.
Note that the condition of Theorem 4, which can also be written as f(dk, x |1) > f(dk, x |0)
for all x ∈ X and k = 1, 2, means that existence of exactly one document is suﬃciently
strong positive evidence to outweigh any negative inference from the private signal x. It
also implies that existence of both documents is likewise strong. The proof of this theorem
requires several rounds of the iterated-elimination procedure.
We next show that policy δBundle, which makes each document inadmissible on its own
but allows the two documents to be admitted as a package, has advantages if the face-value
signal provided by the documents individually is not so strong as to satisfy the presumption
of Theorem 4. We do this in two steps, ﬁrst comparing δBundle to δ0 and then comparing
δFull to δBundle. Note that
q11q21
q10q20
>
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) and
q11q21
q10q20
>
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) .
We shall focus on the range of parameter values such that
q11q21
q10q20
> γ >
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) and
q11q21
q10q20
> γ >
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) . (4)
Theorem 5: Suppose that
q11q21
q10q20
> γ.
In every rationalizable strategy proﬁle of the litigation game in which the litigant is restricted
to disclosures in the set δBundle, the litigant always discloses both documents when they both
exist. Hard evidence is eﬀective and the actual loss ratio for δBundle compared to the no-
evidence policy δ0 is L(δBundle, δ0) = 0.
Theorem 6: Suppose that Inequalities 4 hold. In the setting with no limits on disclosure
(the δFull disclosure policy), there are rationalizable outcomes in which disclosure of a single
document is misleading but disclosure of both documents is eﬀective, and there are also ratio-
nalizable outcomes in which all hard evidence is eﬀective. The potential loss ratio comparing
δBundle to δFull is L(δFull, δBundle) > 1.
For intuition, one can see that there are multiple perfect Bayesian equilibria of the game un-
der policy δFull. There are an inﬁnite number of equilibria in which the litigant discloses both
25
documents when they both exist and otherwise discloses nothing. In such an equilibrium,
the jury’s beliefs satisfy b(d1), b(d2) < r < b(d1d2) because the jury associates disclosure
of one document with an adverse (for the litigant) realization of x. There is also an equi-
librium featuring full disclosure and r < b(d1), b(d2) < b(d1d2). If, for instance, a litigant
with a single document believes that the latter equilibrium is being played, whereas the jury
believes that the litigant behaves according to the former equilibrium, then disclosure of a
single document is misleading to society’s detriment (lowering social welfare compared to
the outcome under policy δBundle).
Implications for Courts
Analysis of the two-document model allows us to expand on the policy implications developed
in the basic model by examining a wider range of admissibility rules. Theorems 5 and 6 yield
the following general conclusion.
Policy Implication 3: To ensure robust use of evidence in litigation, the court sometimes
must require that multiple documents be admissible only as a bundle (not individually).
This conclusion brings to mind a common occurrence in the court: When an attorney
attempts to present marginally relevant evidence, the judge asks where the presentation is
headed and what the attorney intends to establish, and the judge allows the evidence under
the expectation of additional complementary evidence to follow. Cleary (1972) notes that
the judge has the discretion to “ask the proponent what additional circumstances he expects
to prove.”
6 Legal Rules
In this section, we bolster the connection between our model and legal policy by commenting
on how U.S. law deﬁnes “relevance” and how it justiﬁes exclusions according to FRE Rules
403 and 404. We include a brief account of a prominent legal case associated with Rule 403
and we present a numerical example based on this case.
Modern reform of the law of evidence relied heavily on the ideas of James Bradley Thayer,
collected in Thayer’s A Preliminary Treatise on Evidence at the Common Law (1898); see
Anderson, Schum, and Twining (2005) for a recent analysis. Thayer viewed evidence law
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in the typical trial process as focusing on the following four issues: 1) materiality, meaning
the facts to be proved; 2) relevance; 3) admissibility; and 4) the evaluation of weight or
probative force of evidence. The ﬁrst three are matters for the judge. The fourth is for the
jury or other fact-ﬁnder.
Deﬁnitions of the legal terms probative (providing proof regarding a claim) and relevance
(tending to strengthen the particular claim being assessed) indicate that the interpretation
of evidence is often a matter of establishing a degree of conﬁdence rather than reaching a
conclusion with certainty.15 FRE Rule 401 states: “Evidence is relevant if (a) it has any
tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence; and
(b) the fact is of consequence in determining the action.” So clearly the law embraces the
notion that evidence is statistical, as in our model, and relevance is the determination of
whether the evidence provides a signal of the claim being evaluated.
Because juries are responsible for weighing the evidence, with judges providing only
guidance, the potential for evidence to be misleading is a real concern for courts, and we
assert that robustness is a natural objective. Thayer described the analysis of evidence as
being governed by “logic and experience;” Anderson, Schum, and Twining (2005) suggest
that “an alternative interpretation is that the criteria for the weight of evidence are provided
by probability theory, of which there are many versions.”
FRE Rules 403 and 404
The idea that exclusion of evidence can improve fact-ﬁnding is unique to common law sys-
tems (see Damaska 1997). Thayer argued for judicial discretion regarding admissibility. He
suggested that the judge should have discretion to exclude evidence that is “slightly” or
“remotely” relevant, and may “complicate the case” or “confuse, mislead, or tire the minds”
of the jury. This principle is reﬁned in FRE Rule 403, quoted at the beginning of this article,
which is sometimes referred to as the “prejudice rule.” Additionally, the notes of the Advi-
sory Committee for Rule 403 state that “The case law recognizes that certain circumstances
call for the exclusion of evidence which is of unquestioned relevance.” Swift (2000) describes
Rule 403 as “the primary example of guided discretion in modem evidence law.”
15This is not to say that near certainty is never achieved. For example, murder charges against a man
named Juan Catalan were eventually dismissed following submission of a video showing him at a Los Angeles
Dodgers game at exactly the time of the crime (a time pinpointed by witnesses). For details of the case, see
Rubin and Bloomkatz (2008).
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Our modeling exercise provides a rationale for Thayer’s recommendation and Rule 403,
which both focus on the potential for—not certainty of—misleading the jury.16 Our results
provide some guidance for striking a balance between relevance and the potential for mis-
leading the jury. One can view a potential loss ratio L that exceeds 1 as corresponding to the
“substantially outweighed by a danger of” condition of Rule 403.17 Theorems 1-2 and Policy
Implications 1-2 indicate the conditions under which judges should consider excluding hard
evidence. We note also that the law acknowledges the value of incremental evidence—which
we can call marginally relevant—especially if several such pieces can be combined to make
a stronger signal (for example, see the United States v. Pugliese, 2d 1946). Thus the law
recognizes the trade-oﬀs evaluated by our Theorem 6 and Policy Implication 3.
We assert that “unfair prejudice,” “confusing the issues,” and “misleading the jury” all
may arise as manifestations of what in our model is called “misleading evidence,” because
they are problems that can occur when updating beliefs. They also have some nuanced
diﬀerences. For instance, the Advisory Committee notes on 403 states that “ ‘Unfair preju-
dice’ within its context means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis,
commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.” Dolan (1976) notes that courts do not
often make distinctions between prejudice and confusing the issues, and oﬀers the following
guidance: “Confusion of the issues is not always the same as prejudice. The oﬀered evi-
dence may be noninﬂammatory, encouraging not so much an irrational or emotional result
as simply an incorrect one.” In discussing misleading the jury, Dolan writes: “Generally the
problem is with evidence that will, in the court’s view, be given too much weight by the
jury, although neither prejudicial nor involving ancillary issues.”
Rule 404, also stated in the Introduction, documents courts’ general reluctance to allow
character evidence or evidence of a prior conviction about a defendant in a criminal case.
Essentially Rule 404 isolates a special circumstance that, due to its commonality, warrants
its own rule. Although there are some nuances related to a criminal defendant who chooses
to testify at his own trial, overall Rule 404 states that, in the language of our model, the
16Interestingly, it seems, in practice, misleading evidence is viewed as less of an issue for bench trials.
See Capra (2000), which cites Gulf States Utilities Company v. Ecodyne Corporation, 635 F.2d 517 (5th
Cir. 1981). There the Fifth Circuit described exclusion for unfair prejudice in a bench trial as “a useless
procedure.”
17In our model, there can be rationalizable outcomes of the litigation game that give the jury an expected
actual payoﬀ in excess of U∗J , which means that ineﬀective evidence provides a welfare gain, but we presume
that the law would not bank on such an outcome.
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face-value signal of character evidence is so outweighed by the potential litigant-type signal
as to make this kind of evidence unreliable for robust litigation. Appendix B picks up the
discussion with a numerical example.
There are other avenues for exclusion in the common law, some that the model here
may not be equipped to rationalize. In the U.S., evidence obtained by an illegal search
by police is excluded. In addition to diﬀerences in some exclusion laws across countries,
there are interesting diﬀerences across states. In California, the “Pitchess law” provides
many restrictions on defendants’ access to records of a police oﬃcer’s previous discipline for
activities such as evidence tampering. See Rubin (2018) for a discussion of these laws.
Numerical Illustration of a Case
Consider the classic case of Robitaille v. Netoco Community Theatre Inc., 305 Mass. 265.
Robitaille was injured after falling on a stairway at the Netoco Community Theatre and sued
for damages. There was a thick carpet on the stairway and a critical issue in the case was
whether the carpet was loose, which could have occurred due to the tacks holding it in place
having come out. A few weeks before the accident, two girls fell on the stairway when the
carpet was loose. At trial, Robitaille was allowed to present evidence that the two girls fell
although there was not evidence that the condition of the stairway at the time of Robitaille’s
fall was the same as at the time of the earlier fall. Robitaille did not present evidence that
spoke to whether the carpet was loose at the time of her accident. On appeal, it was ruled
that evidence of the prior accident with loose carpet should not have been allowed.
Based on this case, we construct a stylized example in the context of the events that
potentially lead to the relevant likelihood ratios. The following time line describes the
sequence of events.
1. The following exogenous random draws occur at the time of a possible prior accident:
• The rug is loose (	) with probability 1/2 and not loose (n) with probability 1/2.
• The “prior accident” (a) occurs with probability 1/2 if the carpet is loose and
with probability 1/8 if the carpet is not loose.
2. If the carpet was loose and there was a prior accident, the theater owner becomes aware
of the carpet being loose. Otherwise, the owner is not aware of the carpet’s condition
and has no action to take.
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When aware of the loose carpet, a “good” owner, occurring with probability 3/4,
repairs the loose carpet. A “bad” owner does not repair the loose carpet.18 Following
this stage, we describe the carpet as being loose by L and not loose by N , where L
is the case if and only if the rug was previously loose (	) and either no prior accident
occurred or it occurred and the owner is bad (so the carpet is not repaired).
3. A random patron visits the theatre. If L, an accident occurs with probability 1/2. If
N , an accident occurs with probability 1/8.
4. If an accident occurred at Date 3, a lawsuit is initiated and the patron (the litigant in
our model) receives a private signal x ∈ {x, x} = X about the condition of the carpet.
This private signal represents the patron’s noisy observation of the carpet just before
or after the accident. Assume that conditional on N , x occurs with probability 1/4
and x occurs with probability 3/4. Conditional on L, x occurs with probability w and
x occurs with probability 1− w.
Additionally, the litigant possesses document d if and only if there was a prior accident
that occurred with loose carpet (that is, when a and 	 occur).
Our model picks up this story at Date 4, conditional on the accident occurring. The
state θ refers to whether the owner is liable, in which case the jury and society would like
to reach a judgment of liability. Liability (θ = 1) is the event in which, conditional on the
accident occurring, the carpet is loose (L), the prior accident occurred with loose carpet,
and the owner did not repair the carpet. That is, conditional on the accident occurring, a,
	, and L together imply θ = 1. Non-liability (θ = 0) is the complement event, conditional on
the accident occurring. Note that we assume that in order for the case to go to trial, there
must have been an accident.19
By constructing an event tree and calculating the probabilities of the various paths, we
obtain the following conditional probabilities:
f(d, x | 1) = w, f(d, x | 0) = 1
36
, f(d, x | 1) = 1− w, and f(d, x | 0) = 3
36
.
18The assumption that the owner learns of the loose carpet only when there is an accident is for simplicity.
A richer example that has the good owner more likely to become aware of the carpet being loose has similar
qualitative results. One can motivate the two types of owner on the basis of the cost of repairing the carpet,
with the good owner having a small cost and the bad owner facing a large cost. Also, if the “good” owner
is more likely to become aware of the loose carpet, the implications do not change.
19This does not change the qualitative results for the example. A compelling motivation for this is that
if there were no accident then the case would likely be dismissed. Of course, in practice not all frivolous
lawsuits are dismissed. In that direction, we also note that, given our simplifying assumptions for this
example, when the litigant does not possess d, she knows that θ = 0, but it’s also possible that the litigant
possesses d when θ = 0. So there is concern about evidence potentially being misleading here.
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See Appendix B for some of the calculations. Note there are two possibilities for evidence to
be misleading here. Naturally, this depends on how informative the litigant’s private signal
x is, which depends on the value of w.20
For simplicity, assume ψ = 0. Then the inequality in Condition D reduces to f(d,K− |
1) ≤ f(d,K− |0) and the inequality in Condition U reduces to f(d,K+ |1) ≥ f(d,K+ |0). By
Theorem 1, there is scope for evidence to be misleading when Conditions D and U are both
satisﬁed. Because there are only two x-types of litigant in this example, the key question is
whether either f(d, x |1) ≤ f(d, x |0) and f(d, x |1) ≥ f(d, x |0) or f(d, x |1) ≤ f(d, x |0) and
f(d, x |1) ≥ f(d, x |0).
Consider ﬁrst the case in which f(d, x | 1) = 1 − w ≤ f(d, x | 0) = 3/36 and f(d, x | 1) =
w ≥ f(d, x | 0) = 1/36. That is, K− = {x} and K+ = {x}. This requires w ≥ 33/36. So
for large values of w, meaning that the patron has an accurate private signal of whether
the carpet was loose at the time of the litigant’s accident and x suggests it was loose, the
conditions for evidence to be misleading are satisﬁed. Next consider the case in which
f(d, x | 1) = w ≤ f(d, x | 0) = 1/36 and f(d, x | 1) = 1 − w ≥ f(d, x | 0) = 3/36 so that
K− = {x} and K+ = {x}. This requires w ≤ 1/36, implying the litigant has accurate
private information about the carpet. Thus, for extreme values of w, where the litigant’s
private signal is informative relative to the hard evidence, there is a rationalizable outcome
in which evidence d is misleading.
7 Related Literature
We ﬁrst discuss models of evidence in the law-and-economics and the greater economics
literature, and we then discuss work aimed at explaining exclusion. On the former, two
main approaches to modeling evidence stand out. The ﬁrst treats evidence as statistical
in nature but views evidence as arriving exogenously. These models utilize Bayes’ rule
updating but they address neither the parties’ incentives to disclose evidence nor the fact-
ﬁnder’s evaluation of these incentives. The second approach focuses on litigants’ incentives
to produce evidence but treats the adjudicator as a mechanistic system whose judgment is
an exogenous function of the quantities of evidence that the two sides produce. Evidence
20Note that since the probabilities of x and x are ﬁxed following N , the informativeness of the private signal
only depends on w. Because of this simpliﬁcation, the conditions under which evidence can be misleading
below may be more extreme than in practice.
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production is costly, and each party’s marginal cost is higher in the state of the world that
favors the other party. These models treat evidence as an abstract quantity and they conclude
that the litigant types will be separated in equilibrium (although the resulting signal is not
utilized by the adjudicator).21
In the latter set of articles, Daughety and Reinganum (2000a,b) are perhaps the most
related to our modeling exercise. They develop an axiomatic approach with a strategic-search
model of evidence. The second of these articles incorporates a non-Bayesian assessment of
credible evidence by the trial court, suggesting that “Whether one models this as ‘mostly
Bayesian with a few constraints’ or ‘mostly constrained with a few opportunities for Bayesian
updating’ is a judgment call.” Our exercise, in relation, is fully Bayesian but without an
equilibrium assumption.
Other prominent entries in the literature feature both the litigants’ incentive to disclose
evidence and a Bayesian decision maker, but they assume that hard evidence provides deﬁni-
tive proof of the state or some subset of possible states.22 There are also mechanism-design
models that seek to ﬁnd the optimal judgment rule (a mechanism that maps feasible evi-
dence sets to judgments) under the assumption that the litigants will ﬁnd their way to an
equilibrium in the induced evidence-production game.23
In the direction of multiple documents, Fluet and Lanzi (2018) and Guttman, Kremer,
and Skrzypacz (2014) study settings in which a sender may have more than one signal that
can be veriﬁably disclosed, so there are multiple channels of information. Both assume
equilibrium, and they focus on diﬀerent issues than we address. Guttman, Kremer, and
Skrzypacz analyze a setting of ﬁnancial disclosure where the manager of a ﬁrm makes disclo-
sure decisions over two periods. Fluet and Lanzi explore cross-examination. In their model,
21We have here summarized Talley’s (2013) characterization of the law-and-economics literature on evi-
dence. See Talley’s chapter, and also Sanchirico (2010), for citations.
22Milgrom (1981) and Shin (1994) are examples. Che and Severinov (2017) focus on the role for attorneys
to suppress evidence in a model in which litigants probabilistically possess evidence and an additional
judgment-relevant piece of information is observed by attorneys and the court. Both of these are from a
continuum and satisfy a monotone likelihood ratio property. They ﬁnd that attorneys are helpful in that
they can suppress favorable evidence in equilibria with play of weakly-dominated strategies.
23Bull and Watson (2004, 2007), Green and Laﬀont (1986), and Kartik and Tercieux (2012) are examples
in this category. Bull (2012) studies a model in which a piece of evidence can exist both when an accused is
guilty and when he is innocent, but this focuses on the diﬀerent issues of police interrogation and incentives
for evidence fabrication. Tangentially related “Bayesian-persuasion” models involve a sender committing
to an informative experiment to inﬂuence a receiver; Watson (1996) is an early entry here. Those models
typically assume that the sender and receiver have shared prior information. Hedlund (2017) studies Bayesian
persuasion with a privately-informed sender.
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each litigant invests in gathering evidence either to directly support the litigant’s own case or
to counter the other side’s argument in cross-examination. Incorporating this sort of costly
evidence acquisition into our modeling approach may make for some interesting future work.
Turning to possible rationales for excluding hard evidence, Lester, Persico, and Visschers
(2009) provide an explanation that focuses on cognitive limitations of the jury. In their
model, the jury ﬁnds it costly to evaluate evidence and thus faces trade-oﬀs in selecting
lines of evidence to invest time and eﬀort to assess. The jury’s incentives may not be
aligned perfectly with society’s incentives, in which case the judge, by barring some kinds
of evidence, may be able to distort the jury’s choices in a direction that beneﬁts society.
These authors speak of their analysis as providing “several results pointing to the diﬃculty
of eliciting general principles that can inform the exclusion of speciﬁc pieces of evidence as a
general rule.” Our approach proposes a diﬀerent mechanism that leads to socially undesirable
outcomes (based on misleading evidence) and, in comparison, provides a modest foundation
for some general principles. Other examples of a cognitive-limitation approach include Gold
(1986) and Langevoort (1998).24
Two other related articles that develop theory on exclusion of character evidence are
Sanchirico (2001) and Schrag and Scotchmer (1994). These articles suggests that a potential
wrongdoer’s choice of action does not inﬂuence character evidence, and so character evidence
should not be used to provide incentives.25 Lester, Persico, and Visschers (2009) note that
the argument may not ﬁt with Rule 403, which gives the judge a great degree of latitude
“to exclude evidence on a case-by-case basis,” and this seems at odds with the incentive-
providing argument.
8 Conclusion
In this article, we have developed a methodology for analyzing statistical hard evidence,
particularly in distinguishing between the face-value signal and the litigant-type signal. We
24Cognitive limitations also underlie the “story view” of information processing, which postulates that
fact-ﬁnders are best able to process evidence that is woven into a coherent and simple story—especially if
it has a linear logical progression and is supported by analogous experience—and then compare alternative
stories using available data. See Pennington and Hastie (1986, 1991, 1992) and Hastie (1999).
25Sanchirico’s main example is a bar patron who is deciding whether to assault another patron who is
annoying him. The argument is that if the trial decision focuses on trace evidence of whether assault
occurred, even a defendant who has a history of assault in bars would have appropriate incentives.
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have argued for application of the rationalizability concept to study robustness of reasoning
about hard evidence and the decisions of litigants and fact-ﬁnders. Our results provide
conditions under which hard evidence may be misleading, and they also provide guidance
for balancing relevance against the potential to mislead the jury. Overall, we advocate for
policy makers in the law and elsewhere to consider how the interpretation of hard evidence
relates to the incentives to disclose it.
Our modeling exercise is based on the position that it is practically impossible for the law
to commit courts to an optimal mechanism that dictates how evidence is interpreted. There
are too many idiosyncrasies in individual cases for overarching rules to be useful, and the law
would not be able to describe exactly what the interpretation should be for every speciﬁc case.
In other words, fact-ﬁnders such as juries are in the business of processing information and
interpreting evidence, and this is an essential exercise in the pursuit of society’s objectives.
Thus, fact-ﬁnders are ideally Bayesian and the legal system must recognize this, but the
law (and courts) may optimally put some restrictions on how they interpret evidence and
make judgments. Realistic instruments in this regard are admissibility rules and associated
standards of relevance, suitably described in statistical terms. It is the fact-ﬁnder’s job to
evaluate the idiosyncrasies of individual cases, weigh the evidence, and conduct a Bayesian
analysis.
Regarding promising lines for future research, it will be useful to explore more deeply the
incentives of players at the “primary activity” stage (before litigation). In the present model,
the prospect of misleading evidence disappears if an institution coordinates the players on
an equilibrium. Adding primary activity to the model, and in particular actions that are
payoﬀ relevant and aﬀect the availability of evidence (such as eﬀort to get on the surveillance
video in the example in the Introduction), yields a rich environment in which it is optimal
to exclude certain kinds of hard evidence even in equilibrium without it being misleading.
Insights may be generated about incentives in primary activity and the cost of production
or suppression of evidence.26 For instance, depending on the anticipated interpretation, a
potential litigant may choose to take actions that inﬂuence the probability with which hard
evidence will exist.
One could also enrich the current model to allow the litigant’s payoﬀ to depend on the
26Bull (2009) studies legal institutions when there is scope for suppressing evidence, which is modeled as
reducing the probability evidence is available.
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litigant’s type, whether a document exists, and whether the litigant discloses the document.
There could, for example, be a cost of disclosure or a cost of withholding evidence. If costs
such as these are small in relation to the other parameters of the model, then our results will
still hold in a modiﬁed form. Likewise, very large costs in some state and for some litigant
type would be tantamount to nonexistence of the document in this contingency. Moderate
costs, whether or not depending on the litigant’s type or the state, would introduce a new
element in the model, as types may separate on the basis of a cost diﬀerential.
Another avenue for future research is to model the jury as a group of individual strategic
actors, and to explore the scope for miscoordination and disagreement among them on the
interpretation and meaning of evidence. This is a critical issue given that jurors come from
varied backgrounds and typically have not interacted with each other before, and few have
much experience as fact-ﬁnders. Further, it would be interesting to pursue applications of
our model outside the legal realm, such as in ﬁnance and marketing.
Finally, let us comment on a setting with two strategic litigants. The modeling exercise
here was meant to demonstrate the problem of misleading evidence in the interaction between
a single litigant and fact-ﬁnder, honing in the coordination problems in the interpretation
of hard evidence. Our analysis trivially extends to the two-litigant setting if one holds ﬁxed
the behavior of the previously unmodeled opposing litigant. Further, we expect that the
problem of miscoordinated beliefs and behavior would be magniﬁed by the presence of an
additional strategic agent. For instance, the defendant and plaintiﬀ may have diﬀerent beliefs
about how the jury will respond to bundles of hard evidence, and an individual litigant may
incorrectly predict how the other will respond to this litigant’s initial disclosure of hard
evidence. Two-sided private information would further complicate the matter. We hesitate
to make any claims about insights that a modeling exercise with two strategic litigants can
generate, except to say that this seems to be a fruitful direction for future work.
Additionally, we expect that analysis of the kind introduced here may be useful in explor-
ing the justiﬁcation for, and implications of, the Brady Rule. Lempert, Gross, and Liebman
(2000) describe Brady v. Maryland (1963) and United States v. Bagley (1985) as establish-
ing that “prosecutors have a constitutional duty to disclose exculpatory evidence—including
evidence that could be used to impeach government witnesses—if there is a reasonable prob-
ability that disclosure would produce a diﬀerent outcome.” The “reasonable probability”
requirement provides latitude for prosecutors to withhold exculpatory evidence. In terms
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of our model, for evidence possessed by the prosecutor that has a strong face-value signal
in favor of the defendant, this amounts to increasing ψ. However, for other such evidence,
the analysis would be more complicated because there are several layers of interpretation at
issue, including by the prosecutor, an appeals court, the defense, and the jury. Holding aside
the Brady Rule, even if both litigants had access to exactly the same evidence (as in Bull and
Watson’s (2004) enforced discovery requests setting), there is still the issue of interpretation.
An additional element, but not the main reason for the interpretation problem, is that the
jury observes by whom evidence is disclosed.
A Proofs
This appendix contains proofs of the theorems and supporting analysis. We start with details
about how plain consistency (Watson 2017) implies the Bayes’-rule expression even in the
case in which the jury’s initial belief puts zero probability on the document being disclosed.
We claimed in the text that the jury’s posterior belief conditional on disclosure is char-
acterized by Bayes’ rule (Equation 1) for the jury’s initial belief λ or, if Bayes’ rule does not
apply for this belief, then for the jury’s updated belief about the litigant’s strategy. The
latter condition arises in the setting of ψ = 0. Here is the justiﬁcation, which is based on
the assumption that the jury’s belief system satisﬁes plain consistency.
Theorem 7: The following holds for every belief system satisfying plain consistency. The
jury’s posterior belief b(∅) satisﬁes Bayes’ rule, using the jury’s initial belief λ about the
litigant’s strategy. The jury’s posterior belief b(d) satisﬁes Equation 1, where λ is the jury’s
initial belief about the litigant’s strategy if it satisﬁes
∑
x∈X f(Θ, d, x)λ(x) > 0 and otherwise
λ is an arbitrary (updated) belief about the litigant’s strategy.27
Proof: The proof features similar steps as in Watson (2017), Section 4. First, that b(∅)
satisﬁes Bayes’ rule is due to that the prior probability that the jury puts on the document
not being disclosed is strictly positive, and that plain consistency implies proper conditional-
probability updating when possible.
We must also show that b(d) satisﬁes Equation 1. As before, if
∑
x∈X f (Θ, d, x)λ(x) > 0,
then plain consistency implies that the jury uses proper conditional-probability updating in
order to arrive at Equation 1 upon observing document disclosure. We will now consider the
case when
∑
x∈X f (Θ, d, x)λ(x) = 0.
Note that Nature’s strategy in the litigation game is a selection (θ, e, x), and Nature
mixes according to the distribution f . Let SJ denote the jury’s strategy space and let SL
denote the litigant’s strategy space. For every x ∈ X, let SxL be the subset of SL that speciﬁes
disclosing d in the event that x is the private signal and the document exists. Observe that
27This means that the beliefs are structurally consistent (Kreps and Ramey 1987). Note that it must be
that λ(x) > 0 for some x; otherwise, Equation 1 could not hold.
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the sets {SxL} are distinct and not disjoint; for instance, for any given x and x′, the strategy
that always discloses belongs to both SxL and S
x′
L . Deﬁne:
WN(x) ≡ {(1, d, x)} YN(x) ≡ {(θ, d, x) | θ ∈ {0, 1}}
Y−N(x) ≡ SxL×SJ Z(x) ≡ YN(x)×SL×SJ.
Let Y (x) ≡ YN(x)×Y−N(x). Note that {Z(x)}x∈X is a disjoint collection of sets. Because
WN(x)×Y−N(x) ⊂ Y (x) ⊂ Z(x), clearly {Y (x)}x∈X and {WN(x)×Y−N(x)}x∈X are both
disjoint collections of sets as well.
Let hdJ denote the information set in which the jury has observed disclosure of the doc-
ument and must select the judgment a. Let S(hdJ) denote the strategy proﬁles that are
consistent with the game reaching information set hdJ. By the above deﬁnitions of the var-
ious sets, we have that S(hdJ) = ∪x∈XY (x). Further, the subset in which θ = 1 is given by
T ≡ ∪x∈XWN(x)×Y−N(x). Let ph denote the belief at information set h by the player on the
move there about the strategy proﬁle being played; this is called an appraisal. We want an
expression for ph
d
J(T ), which is the deﬁnition of b(d), the probability that the jury puts on
θ = 1 in the event that the document is disclosed.
We can apply the plain consistency condition (see Watson 2017 for deﬁnitions) to get an
expression for the jury’s belief about θ at information set hdJ. Speciﬁcally, we relate player 2’s
appraisal at hdJ to her appraisal at hJ, the artiﬁcial information set for the jury that signiﬁes
the beginning of the game. The required conditions to apply plain consistency on each set
Z(x) are satisﬁed. Sets Y (x) and Z(x) are comparable relative to Nature’s information set,
hJ, and h
d
J. Further, WN(x) ⊂ YN(x). Thus, plain consistency requires the jury’s appraisal
at hdJ to be the product of a distribution over Nature’s strategy and distributions over the
strategies of the litigant and jury. Further, the appraisal must preserve probability ratios in
that
ph
d
J(WN(x)×Y−N(x))
ph
d
J(YN(x)×Y−N(x))
=
phJ(WN(x)×SL×SJ)
phJ(YN(x)×SL×SJ) , (5)
if both denominators are strictly positive.
Note that the terms on the right side of Equality 5 refer to the jury’s belief at the
beginning of the game about Nature’s strategy and, since this belief is initially accurate
because the jury knows the game being played, the right side is simply f(1, d, x)/f(Θ, d, x).
The denominator f(Θ, d, x) is strictly positive for all x ∈ X (recall that we assumed this
in the description of the model). Let us write μ(x) ≡ phdJ(YN(x)×Y−N(x)) for each x.
Multiplying both sides of Equation 5 by μ(x) and summing, we get
∑
x∈X
ph
d
J(WN(x)×Y−N(x)) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)
f(Θ, d, x)
μ(x). (6)
Recall that the collection of sets {WN(x)×Y−N(x)}x∈X is disjoint and the union is T .
Thus, ph
d
J(T ) =
∑
x∈X p
hdJ(WN(x)×Y−N(x)). Also, phdJ(T ) deﬁnes b(d), so the left side of
Equation 6 is simply b(d). Because {Y (x)}x∈X is a disjoint collection and the union is S(hdJ),
we know that
∑
x∈X μ(x) = p
hdJ(S(hdJ)) = 1. Deﬁning π(x) ≡ μ(x)/f(Θ, d, x) for all x,
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Equation 6 becomes
b(d) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)π(x). (7)
Because
∑
x∈X μ(x) = 1, we have
∑
x∈X f(Θ, d, x)π(x) = 1 and Equation 7 is equivalent to
b(d) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)π(x)
∑
x∈X
f(Θ, d, x)π(x)
.
By construction, π(x) ≥ 0 and∑x∈X π(x) > 0. For a small enough strictly positive number
φ and letting λ(x) ≡ φπ(x), we have that λ(x) ∈ [0, 1] for every x ∈ X. Furthermore,
because φ cancels in the fraction, we have
b(d) =
∑
x∈X
f(1, d, x)λ(x)
∑
x∈X
f(Θ, d, x)λ(x)
,
which is exactly Equation 1 from the text and λ(x) may be interpreted as a probability. 
The rest of this appendix deals with the theorems in the main text. For each theorem,
we restate the result and then provide a proof.
Theorem 1: If Condition U fails, then the unique rationalizable outcome has the litigant
disclosing d always at minimum probability ψ, the actual loss ratio is L ∈ (0, 1], and hard
evidence is ineﬀective. If Condition D fails, then the unique rationalizable outcome has the
litigant disclosing d whenever he has it, the actual loss ratio is L = 0, and hard evidence is
eﬀective.28 If Conditions D and U are both satisﬁed, then the potential loss ratio is L > 1
and there are rationalizable outcomes in which hard evidence is misleading.
Proof: Let (a(d), a(∅)) denote the jury’s strategy, the ﬁrst term being the jury’s action in
the event the document is disclosed and the second term being the action in the event the
document is not disclosed. Remember that sequential rationality requires a(d) = b(d) and
a(∅) = b(∅).
Suppose ﬁrst that Condition U fails. Then from Lemma 1 and Theorem 7 the jury’s
posterior beliefs must satisfy b(d) < r ≤ b(∅) regardless of the jury’s initial belief about
the litigant’s strategy.29 Therefore the jury’s strategy must satisfy a(d) < a(∅). In other
words, every strategy of the jury that speciﬁes a(d) ≥ a(∅) cannot be rationalized and so
28Although rationalizability assumes common knowledge of rational behavior, to prove the ﬁrst two claims
we need only that players are rational (best responding to their beliefs) and know this about each other.
29If the jury’s initial belief λ implies strictly positive probability of both disclosure and non-disclosure,
then b(d) is calculated using this function λ. Letting φ be the probability that d is disclosed when the litigant
behaves according to λ, we have r = φb(d) + (1−φ)b(∅) by the law of iterated expectations, and so b(d) < r
implies b(∅) > r. If the jury’s initial belief satisﬁes λ(x) = 0 for all x, then b(∅) = r because non-disclosure
conveys no information.
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is removed from consideration. Because the litigant knows this (rationalizability assumes
common knowledge of sequential rationality), every x-type of litigant strictly prefers to not
disclose the document, regardless of the exact belief about the jury’s strategy. This means
that there is a single rationalizable strategy for the litigant: σ(x) = ψ for all x ∈ X. The
jury knows this and therefore has the belief λ(x) = ψ for all x ∈ X, and hence the jury
accurately updates conditional on disclosure and conditional on no disclosure. There is only
partial disclosure and so hard evidence provides less than its face-value signal, and we have
L ∈ (0, 1].
The same steps establish that if Condition D fails then the jury’s strategy must satisfy
a(d) > a(∅) and the litigant rationally must always disclose: σ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X. The
jury knows this and therefore has the belief λ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ X, and hence the jury
accurately updates conditional on disclosure and no disclosure. There is full disclosure, hard
evidence provides its full face-value signal, and L = 0.
Finally, consider the case in which Conditions D and U both hold. Deﬁne beliefs λ+ and
λ− as in the proof of Lemma 1 in Section 3. Let (b+(d), b+(∅)) denote the jury’s posterior
beliefs derived from initial belief λ+ and let (b−(d), b−(∅)) denote the jury’s posterior beliefs
derived from initial belief λ−. Using the steps in the proof of Lemma 1 and the law of iterated
expectations (as above), we see that b+(d) ≥ b+(∅) and b−(d) ≤ b−(∅). Therefore, if the
jury’s initial belief is λ+ then the jury’s sequentially rational strategy satisﬁes a(d) ≥ a(∅)
and if the jury’s initial belief is λ− then the jury’s sequentially rational strategy satisﬁes
a(d) ≤ a(∅). Any type of litigant can rationalize disclosing with probability 1 in response
to the former strategy and disclosing with the minimum probability ψ in response to the
latter strategy. Thus, no strategies are removed from consideration in the rationalizability
procedure.
From our assumption that f(d, x | 1) 	= f(d, x | 0) for some x, we know that f(d,K− |
0)−f(d,K− |1) > f(d,K+ |0)−f(d,K+ |1), which means that at least one of the inequalities
in Conditions D and U holds strictly. Using the construction in the proof of Lemma 1, this
implies that either b−(d) < r or b+(d) > r.
Take the case in which b−(d) < r. Then we have b−(d) < r < b−(∅) by the law of
iterated expectations. We can then ﬁnd a rationalizable outcome that entails misleading
hard evidence and a welfare loss greater than 1. Suppose the litigant’s actual strategy
is deﬁned by σ = λ+, so the optimal strategy of the jury (if the jury knew that σ was
being played) would specify a(d) = b+(d) and a(∅) = b+(∅), where b+(d) ≥ r ≥ b+(∅).
And any departure from these actions would strictly reduce the jury’s expected payoﬀ.
Speciﬁcally, lowering a(d) and/or raising a(∅) uniformly reduces the jury’s actual expected
payoﬀ. Suppose that the jury’s initial belief is actually λ−, to which the jury rationally
responds by selecting a(d) = b−(d) and a(∅) = b−(∅). Because of quadratic-loss proferences
and that b−(d) < r < b−(∅), the jury’s actual expected payoﬀ is strictly less than it would be
if the jury set a = r regardless of whether the document is presented, which is the expected
payoﬀ in the setting without hard evidence.
The same argument works for the case in which b+(d) > r, by supposing that the litigant’s
actual strategy is σ = λ− whereas the jury’s initial belief is λ+. We have therefore proved
that UJ < U
0
J and so L > 1. 
Theorem 2: Suppose that hard evidence e and private signal x are independent conditional
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on the underlying state θ. There are functions γ : [0, 1] → (0, 1] and γ : [0, 1] → [1,∞),
which depend on the distributions p1(·) and p0(·), with the following properties. For any
given ψ, Condition D is equivalent to q1/q0 ≤ γ(ψ) and Condition U is equivalent to
q1/q0 ≥ γ(ψ). Furthermore, γ is increasing in ψ, γ is decreasing in ψ, γ(1) = γ(1) = 1,
γ(0) ≡ max
x∈X
p0(x)/p1(x), and γ(0) ≡ min
x∈X
p0(x)/p1(x).
Proof: Because f(d, x |θ) = qθpθ(x), we have
K+ ≡ {x ∈ X | q1/q0 ≥ p0(x)/p1(x)} and K− ≡ {x ∈ X | q1/q0 ≤ p0(x)/p1(x)}.
Because these sets depend on q1/q0, let us write K
+ and K− as functions of q1/q0. Note that
K+ is increasing in q1/q0 and K
− is decreasing in q1/q0. The inequalities for Conditions D
and U simplify to, respectively:
q1
q0
≤ ψ + (1− ψ)p0(K
−(q1/q0))
ψ + (1− ψ)p1(K−(q1/q0)) ≡ y(q1/q0)
q1
q0
≥ ψ + (1− ψ)p0(K
+(q1/q0))
ψ + (1− ψ)p1(K+(q1/q0)) ≡ y(q1/q0).
Let us ﬁx ψ. Functions y and y are piecewise constant (their values change only as the
sets K+(q1/q0) and K
−(q1/q0) gain or lose elements as q1/q0 changes), y is left-continuous,
and y is right-continuous. It is clear that φ ≤ y(φ) for all φ ≤ 1 and φ ≥ y(φ) for all φ ≥ 1.
Further, we can show, for any φ′ > φ, that φ > y(φ) implies that φ′ > y(φ′). Likewise for
any φ′ < φ, inequality φ < y(φ) implies that φ′ < y(φ′). In the case of y, for instance,
raising φ to φ′ causes y to change by removing each term x for which p0(x)/p1(x) ∈ [φ, φ′).
Therefore, there are numbers A,B,C,D such that
φ′ >
A
C
≥ φ > y(φ) = 1 + A+B
1 + C +D
, and y(φ′) =
1 + B
1 +D
.
Combining the second and third inequalities and rearranging terms yields A/C > (1 +
B)/(1 +D), which means φ′ > y(φ′). Similar calculations can be done for y.
These properties imply that there exists a value γ(ψ) ≥ 1 such that φ ≤ y(φ) if and
only if φ ≤ γ(ψ), and there exists a value γ(ψ) ≤ 1 such that φ ≥ y(φ) if and only if
φ ≥ γ(ψ), which proves the ﬁrst claim of the theorem. Because p0(K−) ≥ p1(K−) and
p0(K
+) ≤ p1(K+), we know that y is decreasing in ψ and y is increasing in ψ. The limits as
ψ approaches 1 and 0 are obvious, in the latter case by recalling the deﬁnitions of K− and
K+. 
Theorem 3: Fixing ψ, suppose that hard evidence e and private signal x are independent
conditional on the underlying state θ and that γ(ψ) < γ(ψ). Let q1 be bounded away from
0 by a ﬁxed number. Then there is a number L > 1 so that, for all q0 and q1 satisfying
γ(ψ) ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ(ψ), the potential loss ratio satisﬁes L ≥ L.
Proof: This result follows directly from the analysis used to prove Theorem 1. We can
construct the rationalizable outcome described at the end of the proof. Because γ(ψ) < γ(ψ),
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the actual loss L is strictly greater than 1 for all q0 and q1 for which γ(ψ) ≤ q1/q0 ≤ γ(ψ).
The actual loss is a continuous function of q1 and q0, which are in a compact set given the
lower bound on q1, and so the actual loss is minimized over this set. The value L can be
taken to be the minimum loss. 
Theorem 4: Suppose that there are no limits on disclosure (the δFull disclosure policy) and
q11(1− q21)
q10(1− q20) > γ and
q21(1− q11)
q20(1− q10) > γ. (8)
Then the only rationalizable outcome entails full disclosure, the actual loss ratio comparing
δFull to δ0 is L(δFull, δ0) = 0, and hard evidence is eﬀective.
Proof: Our analysis proceeds with a series of claims that we prove in turn. These identify
strategies that cannot be rationalized as sequential best responses and are thus removed in
the iterated procedure for rationalizability.
Claim 1: Whatever is the jury’s belief system, the posteriors satisfy b(d1d2) > r, b(d1) > r,
b(d2) > r, and b(∅) ≤ r.
Using Equation 3 in the text and simplifying, we ﬁnd that b(e′) > r is equivalent to
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
[f(e, x |1)− f(e, x |0)]λe′(x, e) > 0. (9)
For e′ = d1d2, this becomes
∑
x∈X
[q11q21p1(x)− q10q20p0(x)]λd1d2(x, d1d2) > 0. (10)
Recall that we assume q11 > q10 and q21 > q20. Along with the assumption for the theorem—
that Inequalities 8 hold—these imply that q11/q10 > γ and q21/q20 > γ. Also, we know that
γ ≥ 1. So we have
q11q21
q10q20
> γ2 ≥ γ ≥ p0(x)
p1(x)
for all x ∈ X, which means that
q11q21p1(x)− q10q20p0(x) > 0
for all x. This proves that Inequality 10 holds regardless of λd1d2(·, d1d2), which implies
b(d1d2) > r.
For e = d1, Inequality 9 becomes
∑
x∈X
[q11q21p1(x)− q10q20p0(x)]λd1(x, d1d2)
+
∑
x∈X
[q11(1− q21)p1(x)− q10(1− q20)p0(x)]λd1(x, d1) > 0.
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The ﬁrst summation expression on the left covers the case in which e = d1d2 and the second
one covers the case in which e = d1. The analysis above proves that the ﬁrst summation
expression is positive. The second is also positive due to the ﬁrst of Inequalities 8 and
because γ ≥ p0(x)/p1(x) for all x. At least one of the terms must be strictly positive for
some x, for otherwise λd1(x, e) = 0 for all x and e ∈ {d1, d12}, in which case the posterior
belief is not deﬁned. This proves that b(d1) > r. The same steps establish that b(d2) > r.
To prove the last inequality of Claim 1, note that if the jury’s initial belief is that
λ∅(x, e) = 1 for all x and e, meaning that the jury expects no documents to ever be disclosed,
then b(∅) = r. Otherwise, by the law of iterated expectation and the fact that b(d1d2) > r,
b(d1) > r, and b(d2) > r, it must be that b(∅) < r.
Claim 2: Every strategy of the litigant with the property σ∅(x, e) > 0 for some x ∈ X and
some e 	= ∅ is not sequentially rational and therefore removed from consideration in the
iterative-elimination rationalizability procedure.
This claim follows immediately from the previous claim. From Claim 1, we know that,
for every nonempty disclosure, the jury rationally must choose a higher action than it would
if nothing is disclosed. Thus any strategy of the jury that would select a weakly higher action
following disclosure of ∅ cannot be sequentially rational and is removed in the ﬁrst round
of iterated-elimination procedure. The litigant knows this and so it is never sequentially
rational to disclose nothing in a contingency in which the litigant possesses a document, and
strategies that would disclose ∅ are removed in the second round of the iterative-elimination
rationalizability procedure.
Claim 3: Given that the jury understands Claim 2, the jury’s belief system must satisfy
b(d1d2) > b(d1) and b(d1d2) > b(d2).
Note that we can write the jury’s posterior belief about the state in this way:
b(e′) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
(1− r)f(e, x |0)λe′(x, e)
∑
x∈X, e⊃e′
rf(e, x |1)λe′(x, e)
+ 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1
(11)
To prove Claim 3, we start by noting that the jury’s belief about the litigant’s strategy must
satisfy λ∅(x, e) = 0 for every x ∈ X and every e 	= ∅, given Claim 2. That is, the litigant
must disclose one or both documents whenever he or she possesses some hard evidence. This
implies that, when the litigant possesses exactly one document, he must disclose it for sure
and so λd1(x, d1) = 1 and λd2(x, d2) = 1 for all x. Thus, the only behavior not pinned down
is what the litigant would disclose when possessing both documents.
Let us compare b(d1) with b(d1d2). To ease notation, deﬁne y(x) ≡ λd1(x, d1d2) and
z(x) ≡ λd1d2(x, d1d2). Using Equation 11, we have
b(d1) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(
1− r
r
)(
q10
q11
)⎛⎜⎜⎝
1− q20 + q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)y(x)
1− q21 + q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)y(x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1
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and
b(d1d2) =
⎡
⎢⎢⎣
(
1− r
r
)(
q10
q11
)⎛⎜⎜⎝
q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)z(x)
q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)z(x)
⎞
⎟⎟⎠+ 1
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
−1
.
Thus, b(d1) ≥ b(d1d2) is equivalent to
1− q20 + q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)y(x)
1− q21 + q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)y(x)
≤
q20
∑
x∈X
p0(x)z(x)
q21
∑
x∈X
p1(x)z(x)
. (12)
From the deﬁnition of γ, we know that the right side is maximized at the value γq20/q21 by
setting z(x) = 1 for the draw x ∈ X that identiﬁes γ and setting z(x) = 0 for all other x
values. Here we are using the fact that A/B ≥ C/D > 0 implies (A+ C)/(B +D) ≤ A/B.
That is, including additional terms in the summations by raising z(x) above zero would only
lower the fraction.
We next show that the left side of Inequlity 12 is bounded below by 1. To demonstrate
this, let us write ρ0 =
∑
x∈X p0(x)y(x) and ρ1 =
∑
x∈X p1(x)y(x), so the left side can be
written as
1− q20 + q20ρ0
1− q21 + q21ρ1 =
1− q20(1− ρ0)
1− q21(1− ρ1) . (13)
Suppose ρ1 < 1. As ρ1 and ρ0 are total probabilities over the same weighted fraction of
the space X, there must be an x-type x′ ∈ X such that p0(x′)/p1(x′) ≥ (1 − ρ0)/(1 − ρ1).
Otherwise we would have a contradiction in summing over the complementary weighted
fraction of X. This means that γ ≥ (1− ρ0)(1− ρ1). From the assumption of the theorem,
we also know that q21/q20 > γ. Putting this together with the previous inequality implies
that q21(1 − ρ1) > q20(1 − ρ0), and thus the value in Expression 13 is at least 1. In the
case of ρ1 = 1, similar reasoning establishes that we must also have ρ0 = 1 and the value of
Expression 13 is 1.
In summary, we have shown that the right side of Inequality 12 is bounded above by
γq20/q21 and the left side is bounded below by 1. Because q21/q20 > γ, we therefore know
that Inequality 12 cannot hold, and therefore b(d1) < b(d1d2). The same steps establish that
b(d2) < b(d1d2).
Claim 4: Every strategy of the litigant with the property σd1d2(x, d1d2) < 1 for some x ∈
X is not sequentially rational and therefore removed from consideration in the iterative-
elimination rationalizability procedure.
From Claim 3, we know that the jury rationally must choose a strictly higher action when
both documents are disclosed that if exactly one document is disclosed. Thus any strategy of
the jury that would select a weakly higher action following disclosure of a single document
cannot be sequentially rational and is removed in the third round of iterated-elimination
procedure. As a result, it is never sequentially rational for the litigant to disclose a single
document when he possesses both documents, and such strategies are removed in the fourth
round of the iterative-elimination rationalizability procedure.
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Combining Claims 2 and 4, we conclude that every rationalizable outcome entails full
disclosure. Because of this, the jury optimally responds as though the jury directly observed
the existing documents. Any non-optimal action choice is removed in the ﬁfth round of the
iterative-elimination rationalizability procedure. 
Theorem 5: Suppose that
q11q21
q10q20
> γ.
In every rationalizable strategy proﬁle of the litigation game in which the litigant is restricted
to disclosures in the set δBundle, the litigant always discloses both documents when they both
exist. Hard evidence is eﬀective and the actual loss ratio for δBundle compared to the no-
evidence policy δ0 is L(δBundle, δ0) = 0.
Proof: The proof of this theorem follows the same steps as in the proof of Theorem 1 (and
Theorem 2), where we now interpret d1d2 as a single document. 
Theorem 6: Suppose that Inequalities 4 hold. In the setting with no limits on disclosure
(the δFull disclosure policy), there are rationalizable outcomes in which disclosure of a single
document is misleading but disclosure of both documents is eﬀective, and there are also ratio-
nalizable outcomes in which all hard evidence is eﬀective. The potential loss ratio comparing
δBundle to δFull is L(δFull, δBundle) > 1.
Proof: The proof is along the same lines as that of Theorem 1 using the description of beliefs
and behavior that follow the statement of Theorem 6 in the text. 
B Examples and Calculations
This appendix contains calculations for the Rule 403 example in the text, and an additional
example for Rule 404.
Rule 403 Numerical Case Study Calculations
Based on the timeline and probabilities with which events occur speciﬁed in the example,
we can calculate joint probabilities f(e, x, θ, A), where A denotes that the accident occurred.
These are:
f(d, x, 1, A) =
w
32
, f(d, x, 0, A) =
3
512
, f(d, x, 1, A) =
1− w
32
, f(d, x, 0, A) =
9
512
,
f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, f(∅, x, 0, A) = w
8
+
1
64
, f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, and f(∅, x, 0, A) = 1− w
8
+
3
64
.
From these, one can calculate the conditional probabilities, which suppress the A, found in
the text.
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Rule 404 Numerical Case Study – Character Evidence
Judges in the U.S. are generally reluctant to allow character evidence or evidence of a prior
conviction about defendants in criminal cases, as Rule 404 forbids under some conditions.
Here, we do not explore the more nuanced issues concerning a criminal defendant who chooses
to testify at his trial.30 Instead, we consider general ideas such as those found in People v.
Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, a well-known case in which the defendant testiﬁed, and we focus on
evidence of a prior conviction presented in this case.
Harvey Lynn Beagle II appealed his conviction by a jury of attempted arson and arson.31
Here is a brief summary of the relevant facts of the case. On May 25, 1969, Beagle was
kicked out of Rudy’s Keg because he “became intoxicated and obnoxious while a patron in
the bar.” At the time, Beagle made comments, about hiring someone to “ﬁre bomb” the bar.
Then in the afternoon of July 1st, Beagle asked the owner of the bar if he could return to the
bar and was told no. Later that night, the roof of the building that housed the bar caught
ﬁre after what seemed to be an explosion. The bar owner put out the ﬁre and discovered a
soda bottle containing gasoline and a wick. Shortly after that, Beagle was arrested at his
nearby apartment. He smelled of gasoline and had several books of matches in his pockets.
Beagle appealed on several grounds. One of these was that evidence of his having a prior
conviction for writing a bad check was allowed. The Supreme Court of California found this
inappropriate.32 The general idea is that a judge should have discretion to exclude some
prior convictions from being admitted as evidence.33
Consider a numerical example, motivated by Beagle, in which a prosecutor may choose
whether to disclose d, which represents evidence of a prior conviction of the defendant for
writing a bad check. A time line of the events follows.
1. A random draw determines whether there is a bad check prior conviction (c) or not
(n). Evidence d exists if and only if c is realized. Assume c occurs with probability
1/2 and n occurs with probability 1/2.
2. If c is realized, the person either reforms, which we denote by g, or has a higher propen-
sity for criminal behavior, which we denote by b. Assume g occurs with probability
1/2 so that b also occurs with probability 1/2.
3. The defendant is matched with a bar/situation. The type with no prior conviction
30There is a bit more judicial discretion when the defendant testiﬁes as a witness because there is scope
for using character evidence or evidence of prior convictions to impeach a witness. Potentially diﬀerent rules
apply to civil cases.
31The Supreme Court of California heard the case on January 5, 1972.
32It noted: “Although we reject all of the many contentions presented by defendant on appeal from the
judgment, we nevertheless conclude, inter alia, that a trial judge must exercise his discretion to prevent
impeachment of a witness by the introduction of evidence of a prior felony conviction when the probative
value of such evidence is substantially outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. (See Evid. Code, §352.)”
33The court noted that the nature of the prior conviction and whether it reﬂects badly on the defendant’s
honesty or integrity is a factor in determining whether it should be allowed to impeach the defendant as a
witness. How recent the prior conviction was is also a factor. Additionally, it’s noted that a prior conviction
for a similar crime should be “admitted sparingly.” The court cites Judge (later Chief Justice) Burger in
Gordon v. United States (1967) 383 F.2d 936, 940-941 [127 App.D.C. 343] on these. The idea is that prior
convictions for similar crimes may put signiﬁcant pressure on a jury to convict. The court also suggested
that the eﬀects on the incentive for the defendant to testify should also be considered. We suggest that all
of theses issues ﬁt with our model.
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commits the crime with probability 1/5, type g with probability 1/10, and type b with
probability 1/2.34 If the defendant does not commit the crime, with probability 1/5
someone else does.
4. Following commission of the crime and the defendant’s arrest, the prosecutor’s private
information x is realized as follows.35 If the defendant has no prior conviction, x = g.
For type g, x is realized with probability 1/4 and x is realized with probability 3/4.
For type b, x is realized with probability w and x is realized with probability 1− w.
Our model picks up the story at Date 4. As we are considering the prosecutor’s disclosure
decision, θ = 1 corresponds to the defendant being guilty. We assume that the case is not
brought when the crime is not committed.
By constructing an event tree and calculating the probabilities of the various paths, we
obtain the following joint probabilities of the form f(e, x, θ, A), where A denotes that the
crime was committed:
f(d, a, 1, A) = 0, f(d, a, 0, A) = 0, f(d, x, 1, A) =
1
160
+
w
8
, f(d, x, 0, A) =
9
800
+
w
40
,
f(d, x, 1, A) =
3
160
+
1− w
8
, f(d, x, 0, A) =
27
800
+
1− w
40
, f(∅, a, 1, A) = 1
10
,
f(∅, a, 0, A) = 2
25
, f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, f(∅, x, 0, A) = 0, f(∅, x, 1, A) = 0, and f(∅, x, 0, A) = 0.
From these, we obtain the following conditional probabilities (suppressing A):
f(d, x | 1) = 1
40
+
w
2
, f(d, x | 0) = 3
40
+
w
6
,
f(d, x | 1) = 3
40
+
1− w
2
, and f(d, x | 0) = 9
40
+
1− w
6
.
As in the numerical example shown in the text, there are two possibilities for evidence to be
misleading here. Naturally, this depends on how informative the litigant’s private signal is,
which here depends on the value of w.
Consider ﬁrst the case in which f(d, x | 1) = 3/40 + [1/2][1 − w] ≤ f(d, x | 0) = 9/40 +
[1/6][1 − w] and f(d, x | 1) = 1/40 + w/2 ≥ f(d, x | 0) = 3/40 + w/6. That is, K− = {x}
and K+ = {x}. This requires w ≥ 11/20. So for large values of w, meaning that the
prosecutor has an accurate private signal of whether the previously convicted defendant
has reformed and x suggests b, the conditions for evidence to be misleading are satisﬁed.
Next consider the case in which f(d, x | 1) = 1/40 + w/2 ≤ f(d, x | 0) = 3/40 + w/6 and
f(d, x | 1) = 3/40 + [1/2][1 − w] ≥ f(d, x | 0) = 9/40 + [1/6][1 − w] so that K− = {x}
and K+ = {x}. This requires w ≤ 3/20, implying that the prosecutor has accurate private
34Regarding the probabilities with which each type commits the crime, we note the following. Someone
who has been convicted of writing a bad check might learn from the experience, and wish to avoid any
further legal problems. For that type of defendant, the prior conviction for writing a bad check may actually
make it less likely that he would commit a crime like arson. On the other hand, it’s possible the conviction
caused the defendant to feel animosity towards those in authority, including someone who owns a bar and
can prevent him from drinking there. In this case, the prior conviction may make it more likely that the
defendant would commit arson.
35The prosecutor may be better informed than the fact-ﬁnder regarding the defendant’s type.
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information about whether the previously convicted defendant has reformed. We conclude
that for extreme values of w, where the litigant’s private signal is informative relative to the
hard evidence, there is a rationalizable outcome in which evidence d is misleading.
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